The World Council of the Cedars Revolution
Representing the hopes and aspirations of many millions of Lebanese throughout the Diaspora
2300 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20037
www.cedarsrevolution.net
cedarsrevolution@gmail.com

WCCR Press release (arabic): Col Barakat supports statement to President’s Bush Order

بيان

“ثورة الأرز في زيارة الى الامم المتحدة في خطوات لضبط الحدود اللبنانية السورية لمواجهة الإرهاب”.

نيويورك في 9 آب 2007

أجرى الوفد المشترك للمجلس العالمي لثورة الارز واللجنة الدولية القرار 1559 سلسلة اجتماعات مع أعضاء في مجلس الامن في الامم المتحدة، ركز فيها على الملفات الاستراتيجية المتعلقة في الاوضاع اللبنانية الراهنة. وقد ضّم الوفد المهندس طوم حرب أمين عام اللجنة، والمهندس فادي برق مدير المجلس في الولايات المتحدة، المهندس آبلان فارس مدير الاعلام للمجلس، والشيخ سامي الخوري الرئيس السابق للجامعة الثقافية اللبنانية في العالم. وقد رافق الوفد البروفسور وليد فارس، كبير الباحثين في مؤسسة الدفاع عن الديموقراطيات في واشنطن.

عقد الوفد اجتماعه الاول مع سفير المكسيك لدى الامم المتحدة بحضور مسؤولين في البعثة وبحث في كيفية حشد التأييد لتنفيذ القرارات الدولية تجاه لبنان، ولا سيما من قبل الدول الاعضاء في الجمعية العامة وبشكل خاص دول اميركا اللاتينية التي يحظى المكسيك فيها بأهمية خاصة. وقال الشيخ سامي الخوري، وهو القنصل السابق في الاكوادور ان المكسيك قد ساعد لبنان منذ السبعينات حيث رفع الملف اللبناني الى الامم المتحدة في العام 1978 لوقف الاعتداءات السورية عليه منذ ذلك العام. وأكد الشيخ سامي الخوري ان ملايين اللبنانيين في اميركا اللاتينية، ومنهم في المكسيك، يقفون بحزم ضد الارهاب ويطالبون حكوماتهم بالضغط على الامم المتحدة للتعجيل في تطبيق القرارات الدولية ولا سيما تلك المتعلقة بنزع سلاح الارهابيين والميليشيات وردع النظامين السوري والايراني من متابعة حربهم الارهابية على لبنان. السفير المكسيكي كلود هيلير قال من جهته ان المجتمع الدولي عامة والمكسيك بشكل خاص ملتزمون بسيادة لبنان وبكل القرارات الدولية ولا سيما القرارين 1559 و1701. ووعد السفير المكسيكي بان بلاده واصدقائها في اميركا اللاتينية سوف تستمر في دعمها للبنان ولشعبه.
وقد زار الوفد بعد ذلك البعثة اللبنانية لدى الامم المتحدة واجتمع مع الانسة كارولين زيادة السكرتيرة الاولى في البعثة، ووضعها في اجواء التحرك مع مجلس الامن. ومن ثم عقد الوفد اجتماعا مطولا في مقر البعثة الاميركية لدى مجلس الامن مع السفير زلماي خليل زاد بحضور مساعديه. وقد طرح الوفد الملفات الاساسية وهي الحدود اللبنانية- السورية، الانتخابات الرئاسية، الحرب الارهابية على لبنان والمحكمة الدولية. وركز الوفد على تطور الوضع الراهن والتهديد الذي يشكله المحور الايراني-السوري مباشرة لامن اللبنانيين وحرياتهم. ودعى الوفد مجلس الامن الى التحرك السريع من اجل منع ضرب الديموقراطية في الاشهر القادمة. وقد سلم الوفد السفير خليل زاد الملف الشامل لتقرير لجنة 1559 حول الخروقات السورية للحدود اللبنانية. وقال السفير خليل زاد بان الولايات المتحدة ملتزمة كليا” بقرارات الامم المتحدة المتعلقة بلبنان، وهي تراقب عن كثب تطور الاوضاع فيه، وأضاف السفير الاميركي ان واشنطن لن تسمح للارهاب بان ينتصر في لبنان.

وبعد ذلك عقد الوفد اجتماعا مطولا في البعثة الفرنسية حيث التقى نائب السفير جان بيار لاغروا (علما ان السفير قد تم استبداله) ومساعديه وتم التركيز على اوضاع القوات الدولية في الجنوب وقال مسؤولو البعثة الفرنسية ان تعليمات الحكومة الفرنسية تحت اطار الامم المتحدة هي القوات الدولية بان تدافع عن نفسها اذا ما تم الاعتداء عليها. وتعليقا عن سلسلة الزيارات قال المهندس حرب ان قوى الضغط اللبنانية ستستمر بعملها لدى مجلس الامن حتى يتم مواجهة التحديات الكبرى وهي: ارسال قوات دولية الى الحدود اللبنانية السورية، انتخاب رئيس جديد للجمهورية، البدأ بعمل المحكمة الدولية، وتمكين الجيش اللبناني من مواجهة الارهاب وحماية اللبنانيين على كل الاراضي اللبناني.

2300 M Street, NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC, USA 20037
Phone + 1 202 416 1819, Fax + 1 202 293 3083
Email:sg1559@un1559.org
www.UN1559.org

Monday 25th of June, 2007

H.E. Mr. Juan Antonio Yáñez-Barnuevo
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations
One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza,
245 East 47th Street, 36th Floor, New York, NY 10017
(212) 661-1050
(212) 949-7247 fax

RE: - Condolences to UN, To UNIFIL and To Spain
- The UNSC has now been put on notice

Ambassador Yáñez-Barnuevo,

The Lebanese International Committee for Implementation of UNSCR 1559 is saddened at the loss of the UNIFIL’S six peace keeping soldiers in southern Lebanon. We extend to the UN, UNIFIL and to Spain the native country of those deceased, our most heartfelt condolences and our gratitude for their sacrifice in the endeavor of protecting the innocent people of Lebanon. We share in the pain and loss of honorable peacekeepers. Their memory as martyrs will be engraved in the history books of Lebanon for ever.

Simultaneously, we condemn the action of those responsible for the attack which resulted in the killings. In issuing such a condemnation, we must remember the threats of the Syrian President Bashar Assad, who vowed to set Lebanon and the Middle East on fire. This ferocious tyrant specifically chose the territory under UNIFIL control to carry out his execution either directly or through his proxies Hezbollah and the armed terrorist groups.

The message is loud and clear, Southern Lebanon is traditionally Hezbollah territory. We are being reminded that Hezbollah is fully equipped and armed with a military arsenal capable of waging war on any neighboring country as well as having the capabilities of decimating any opposition inside Lebanon. Together with their terrorist affiliates such as Islamic fundamentalist, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Fatah Al Islam and other armed Palestinians they can strike at the UNIFIL at any time of their choice. This is designed to strike fear in the hearts and minds of UNIFIL and drive them out of Lebanon. The object is total domination of Lebanon and the entire Middle East.

The facts are before us, the proof is at hand and gradually but continuously unfolding. As such, once again we call on the United Nations Security Council to proceed with the full implementation of UNSCR 1559 & 1701 and extend its mandate to protect the Lebanese – Syrian border from the free flow of arms from Syria into Lebanon and remove all weapons from all terrorist organizations on Lebanese soil including Hezbollah. The consequences of continued inaction are too gruesome to contemplate.

For and on behalf of the International Committee for the Implementation of UNSCR 1559

Tom Harb
Secretary General

CC: UN Security Council Members

اللجنة اللبنانية العالمية لتنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن الرقم 1559

Iran’s and Syria’s Plan: An Interpretation By: Michael Young The Daily Star Many Lebanese, particularly in the majority camp, have been preoccupied with the court being set up to try suspects in the assassination of the late Rafik Hariri. The resignation of Serge Brammertz from the International Criminal Court to devote himself full-time to the upcoming Hariri trial suggests there is something there for them to look forward to.
Eyal Zisser ‘Turkey is in a central position in Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations’
Syrian-Israeli shiduch There is a bride and groom, but where, oh where can one find a rabbi to officiate?
Syrian FM: Syria ready to renew peace talks with Israel
Syria: Washington blocking renewal of peace talks
Withering Heights Golan residents on reports that Israel could withdraw
Patraeus - Syria Door to Foreign Fighters; Murr - No Evidence yet of Syria Support for Fatah Islam
Russia Starts Delivery of Sophisticated Fighter Jets to Syria
MiGs Will Defend Syria and Iran
“Alawi Identity in Syria,” MA Thesis by Torstein Worren
Former Syrian Minister: Ramallah Could Become Palestinian Saigon
IMF Report: “The Syrian economy did remarkably well in 2006″
U.S. attacks Syria sentencing

TimeBlog Will Lebanon Become A Failed State?
Palestinian mediators bring hope of ceasefire to Lebanon Fatah al-Islam and Lebanese enter negotiations as Palestinian refugees prepare to return.
Six UN troops die in Lebanon blast
Car bomb kills six Unifil peacekeepers in Lebanon At least four Spanish peacekeepers were killed and four were injured when their convoy was hit by a roadside bomb.
Time Summer War in Lebanon: the Sequel
Fearing a Return of the Bad Old Days By: Hussain Abdul-Hussain International Herald Tribune Lebanon is on the brink of civil war, with regional Shiite-Sunni tension running high and domestic political divisions sending the nation to the verge of collapse. But the Lebanese do not seem anxious to repeat the 15 years of civil strife that ended in 1990, the bitter memories of which are still vivid in their minds
Franchising Al Qaeda By: Rita Katz and Josh Deven The Boston GlobeAs the Lebanese Army continues to battle Fatah al-Islam, a jihadist group operating in the Nahr Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, questions are being raised about the group’s relationship to Al Qaeda and whether it is an official part of Osama bin Laden’s network.
Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List
Army Provides a Sense of Unity in Fractured Lebanon
Fred Halliday Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq: three crises The explosion of violence in Lebanon and Palestine is the culmination of long-term shifts in the balance of power between states and armed groups in the middle east. It is ever more clear that the outcome in Iraq will be decisive for the region’s future
U.S. Envoy’s Challenges, Hopes By: Trudy Rubin Miami HeraldTwenty-five years ago, a young American Foreign Service officer named Ryan Crocker was dealing with sectarian militias and suicide bombers in Lebanon. Today, as U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Crocker is confronting a mess that makes Lebanon look simple by comparison.

Washington Post Last Chance for Abbas By Charles Krauthammer, Gaza is now run not by a conventional political party but by a movement that is revolutionary, Islamist and terrorist. Worse, Hamas is a client of Iran. Gaza now constitutes the farthest reach of the archipelago of Iranian proxies: Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mahdi Army (among o…
Guardian Hamas acted on a very real fear of a US-sponsored coup Jonathan Steele: Washington’s fingerprints are all over the chaos that has hit Palestinians. The last thing they now need is an envoy called Blair.
Rosner Is there an alternative to a Palestinian state?
ACRI & Democracy / The cost of controlling others It is impossible to rule over a population of about four million people for more than 40 years without democratic rights and continue to be called a democracy.
Abu Mazen’s Options In the Aftermath of Hamas’ Coup d’Etat Raghida Dergham - Neither is the Syrian government capable of funding more than a Palestinian movement and faction to work for it here and there, nor the Iranian government is capable of funding Hamas to assume the role of a government in Gaza.
Olmert rejects U.S. proposal for final status ’shelf accord’
Zvi Bar’el: What options does Abbas have left?
Gideon Levy: Israel must let Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip live
The only chance to defeat HamasThere is clearly no military option for Israel in the Gaza Strip.
Gaza and the Arabs / Putting the Palestinian house in order
Robert Satloff A secure peace Ze’ev Schiff was the finest military reporter in a land that takes military matters seriously. Washington knew Ze’ev as the wisest of the wise men. He knew his facts, he had impeccable sources; and he checked, double checked, and then checked them again.
Fatah detains many Hamas members in West Bank
Even in Iran, consensus cracks over Hamas actions
PA intelligence chief: Iran aided Hamas in takeover of Gaza Strip
Trusting Mahmud Abbas. Again
Jordan’s King: Sharm summit must lead to PA-Israel talks
Shin Bet chief: Hamas may use terror to thwart support for PA
PA intel chief: Hamas takeover was coordinated with Iran
BBC Yellow at your peril In Gaza, choosing the right colour is a matter of life and death ACRI & Democracy / We can’t withdraw yet We must not withdraw from the territories except in the framework of a peace agreement that will regularize their status.
Members of the tribe / What makes a Jewish leader The billionaires’ and professional executives’ control of the Jewish establishment is a relatively new phenomenon.
Indyk Recalling ‘Wolfie’s’ wisdom
Shimon Peres Every word hewn in stone
He understood - and believed By Itamar Rabinovich
Lessons from Palestine
Linking the Gaza Strip with the West Bank: Implications of a Palestinian Corridor Across Israel - Justus Reid Weiner and Diane Morrison (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) (64pp., pdf file]
New Approach to Palestinian Question Just a Castle in the Sand - Nahum Barnea
BBC Voices from Gaza Hamas restores order - but Palestinians consider the future ‘We support Hamas, Hizbullah’ In interview with Newsweek, chairman of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Larijani says terror groups merely ‘defending their own land.’ Additional UN sanctions won’t impede nuclear program, he adds
Who wants to be PM?
Let Egypt into Gaza
Fatah isn’t enough/ Shaul Arieli
Israel wants Saudis in on peace effortsPMO hopes to get “moderate” regimes involved in future initiatives after summit.
Twelve Months of National Emergency By: Dan Ben David Haaretz President Bush will have to decide whether to attack Iran within the next 12 months. If he attacks, Israel is guaranteed a ballistic shower from Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and possibly from Syria and the West Bank as well. If Bush chooses not to attack, then the Israeli government will have to decide during the next 12 months if the country is capable of carrying out a military operation against Iran.
UPI Analysis: What changed after Lebanon War?
Time Seeing Hope in a Hamas Victory
Hamas isolation How the West wants to give its support to Fatah
U.S. to increase military aid to Israel under new deal
Israel Harel: Mahmoud Abbas is a fiction
Washington Institute It’s Up to Hamas Now
Fatah’s last stand: collapse or conspiracy? By Dion Nissenbaum McClatchy Newspapers As they gave up compound after compound to advancing Hamas forces, weary Fatah fighters fell back toward the seaside presidential compound in Gaza to make their last stand. But there was no last stand. Instead, Fatah leaders fled by boat and on foot, leaving lower-level fighters feeling betrayed
Former Hamas prisoners remember Fatah torture
‘Likud will win elections’

Poll: If elections held today Likud will win with majority of 29 seats, followed by Labor with 18
BBC Abbas accuses Hamas of coup plot Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas accuses Hamas of trying to set up its own state in Gaza.
Egypt fears Iranian-backed Hamas
Don’t Underestimate Hamas’ Extremism By: Barry Rubin The Japan TimesHamas’ capture of the Gaza Strip has created, along with Iran, a second radical Islamist state in the Middle East. The region, probably the Arab-Israeli conflict and certainly the Palestinian movement will never be the same.
Haaretz defense editor, veteran reporter Ze’ev Schiff dies at 74 Described as ‘the most respected military analyst in Israel’; Schiff wrote for Haaretz for over 50 years.
Burston: Hamas wants Israel to starve Gaza, hold Barghouti
Fatah Central Cmte. decides to completely cut off Hamas ties
Forward Israel Drawn Into Debate on Missile Defense
Dichter to ‘Post’: Kadima must be ready to replace Olmert
Carter: Stop favoring Fatah over Hamas
Yedioth Ahronoth ‘Two-state solution possible’ After meeting with Bush, Olmert says Israel seeking to cooperate with new Palestinian government to work towards two-state solution. IDF to stay out of Gaza for now, but will likely intervene if situation deteriorates
Looking to Uncle Sam/ Barnea
Time to destroy Hamas
A new Road Map
Fatah Security Strongman Dahlan: West Bank In Danger Of Being Overrun By Hamas
On the Escalator to Another War By: Patrick J. Buchanan Miami HeraldThese are the “birth pangs” of a “new Middle East,” said Condi Rice last summer, as Israel pounded Lebanon. Unfortunately, the new Middle East may make us all pray for the return of the old.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tom Lantos, Chairman
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5021

Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building . Date: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Time: 1:00 PM Subject: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Witnesses:

***Mr. Michael Jacobson
Senior Fellow
Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy
The Washington Institute

Mr. Alexander Ritzmann
Senior Fellow
European Foundation for Democracy

Mr. James Phillips
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

***NOTE: Please be advised that the witness list has changed.

Chairman Robert Wexler
Hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe House Committee on Foreign Affairs
June 20, 2007

“Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List”

I would like to welcome everyone to this critical hearing on the issue of adding Hezbollah to the European Union (EU) terrorist list. I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses, Michael Jacobson, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Alex Ritzmann, Senior Fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy; and James Phillips, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

Since its inception, Hezbollah has led a global campaign of terror that has resulted in hundreds of senseless deaths beginning with the horrific 1983 bombings of the U.S. and French Army barracks in Beirut in which 241 American Marines and 58 French paratroopers were killed. More recently, Hezbollah attacked Israel in an unprovoked act of aggression across an internationally recognized border that resulted in war and further destabilized the Middle East. Today, Hezbollah continues to smuggle illicit weapons across the Lebanese border with Syria, and experts speculate it may be planning future terrorist attacks against Israel. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is working with Syria to destablize the government of Prime Minister Siniora, while at the same time, continuing to operate as a terrorist proxy on behalf of Iran.

While Hezbollah’s belligerence continues unabated in the Middle East, it enjoys a large degree of operational freedom in Europe because it is not classified as a “terrorist organization” by the EU. Hezbollah has established a wide logistical support network in Europe, which allows it to fundraise under the auspices of charities and use the European banking system to transfer funds from Iran. Last year, the U.S. Department of Treasury took punitive measures against the Iranian Bank Saderat for transferring over $50 million in a period of five years to Hezbollah through the bank’s London branch.

Hezbollah has clearly exploited its freedom to channel money through the UK, and has also established a presence in other EU Member states, including Germany and France. According to an annual intelligence report, German security services estimate that more than 900 “core activists” are in the country, regularly meeting in community centers and mosques. I encourage all EU Member States to conduct similar investigations concerning Hezbollah’s presence in Europe so that they may better understand and target this disconcerting threat growing in their own backyard.

At a time when the United States and the European Union (EU) are working together to thwart Iran’s nuclear development and punish the Iranian government for its brazen defiance of the UN, we must also work together to confront Iran’s proxy organization – Hezbollah. The EU has placed the second-highest Hezbollah official on its terrorist list, and EU Member States have taken legal action against Hezbollah, including the German deportation of a Hezbollah agent and the French banning of Hezbollah television, al Manar.

I commend the Dutch government for its bold decision in 2004 to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group with no distinction between its so-called military and political wings. I also want to recognize the European Parliament for passing a resolution in March 2005 by a vote of 473 to 8 distinguishing Hezbollah as a “terrorist organization” and calling on the EU Council to take “all needed measures to put an end to the terrorist activities of this group.” This was followed by a Congressional resolution calling on the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list that passed the House and the Senate with nearly unanimous support.

While the American and European legislative bodies have spoken, the strongest argument for adding Hezbollah has been made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah himself. In an interview in March 2005 aired on al Manar, he stated that designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization in Europe would mean “the sources of [our] funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material support will be destroyed.” Hezbollah fears its designation as a terrorist group, and it defies logic that the EU would continue to omit it from its list.

Last year, High Representative Solana affirmed to the press that the EU did not have enough information to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. I hope this hearing will serve as a source of valuable information for officials in Brussels and all EU Member States, which can be drawn upon at the next meeting of the “Clearing House,” the EU entity that designates terrorist groups. The designation of Hezbollah is long overdue, and I call on the EU to join the United States, Canada and the Netherlands in adding Hezbollah to its terrorist list.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tom Lantos, Chairman
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5021

Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building . Date: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Time: 1:00 PM Subject: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Witnesses:

***Mr. Michael Jacobson
Senior Fellow
Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy
The Washington Institute

Mr. Alexander Ritzmann
Senior Fellow
European Foundation for Democracy

Mr. James Phillips
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

***NOTE: Please be advised that the witness list has changed.

Prepared Statement

Michael Jacobson, Senior Fellow, Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence & Policy
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
June 20, 2007

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe

Introduction

Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. The hearing today is on an important topic, which has not always received the public attention it deserves. Understandably, in the terrorism arena, most of the focus over the past five years has been on al Qaeda and its affiliates, and what governments are doing to combat their terrorist activities. Often forgotten in the process is Hezbollah, which many experts regard as an even more capable and potentially dangerous organization.

Hezbollah is an organization with a global reach, with an extensive presence in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. In his written testimony, my colleague Matthew Levitt discussed Hezbollah’s European activities at length, outlining Hezbollah’s involvement in numerous past terrorist acts in Europe, its use of Europe as a launching pad for attacks elsewhere, and its ongoing fundraising and recruiting. I’ll focus my remarks today on why Hezbollah is not banned, and what impact a ban could have.

Why is Hezbollah not banned?

Reviewing Hezbollah’s lengthy record of terrorist activity, violence, and disruptive actions, it raises the question as why to the Europeans have not added the organization to its terrorist list. The answer lies primarily in the bureaucratic system that the European Union (EU) has set up for adding groups – other than those affiliated with al Qaeda and the Taliban—to its terrorist lists.

The EU maintains two separate lists of terrorist organizations, entities, and individuals. It is important to understand the distinctions between these lists to realize why the EU has not yet banned Hezbollah, and why it is such an uphill struggle.

Al Qaeda/Taliban: One of the EU’s terrorist lists is comprised of al Qaeda and Taliban members, who have been designated by the UN’s so-called “1267 committee.” This UN committee is responsible for all issues relating to UN Security Council Resolution 1267, passed in 1999 to increase pressure on the Taliban to evict al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Any individual or entity designated under Resolution 1267 is –for all intents and purposes — automatically added to the EU’s own list of terrorist subjects. Under EU law, all EU member states are then required to impose the sanctions mandated by the UN Security Council: 1) freeze the assets of those designated persons and groups within their jurisdiction; 2) restrict individuals from those entities from traveling through their territories, and; 3) to prevent anyone under their jurisdiction from trading arms with listed entities.

Other Terrorist Organizations: The European Union also maintains a list of terrorists who are not affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban. In reality, this list comprises two components– one for external terrorist organizations (i.e. non-European) and one for internal. The external component, which includes Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is the one that Hezbollah would be added to, should the Europeans move in this direction. The internal list includes such groups as Spain-based ETA and the Real Irish Republican Army. The impact of being banned differs, depending on whether an organization, entity or individual is on the external or internal list. For external terrorist groups, such as Hamas and PIJ, all EU member states are required to freeze all assets within their jurisdiction, and financial transactions are banned as well. For the internal groups, the member states are free to devise their own mechanisms for how the sanctions should be implemented.

Obstacles to Designation: The primary obstacle in adding Hezbollah to the list stems from the fact that consensus among all 27 European Union member is required to add or remove a name from the non-al Qaeda list. Economic sanctions fall largely under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or the so-called “second pillar” under the Treaty on European Union. Under the CFSP, to amend the existing list, the European Council – consisting of representatives of all of the member states – must unanimously agree on a “common position.” Achieving consensus is, not surprisingly, a more difficult endeavor as the EU continues to expand.

France has publicly led the charge against a Hezbollah designation. With its historical role and ties in Lebanon, France has always paid close attention and been highly sensitive to the political situation in Lebanon. France has been reluctant to take action which they believe could upset the tenuous domestic political balance. Hezbollah’s role as a political party has greatly complicated this situation. As a former French Foreign Minister stated, “Hezbollah has a parliamentary and political dimension in Lebanon. They have members of parliament who are participating in parliamentary life. Political life in Lebanon is difficult and fragile.” Other countries which apparently oppose an EU designation – but far less vocally in most cases – reportedly include Spain, Belgium, Greece, and Italy.

In terms of the current dynamic, what is also likely now fueling European opposition is the presence of European military forces in largely Shia Southern Lebanon, as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). An enhanced UNIFIL force was put in place in the wake of last summer’s war, primarily to monitor the cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah. Countries such as France, Spain, Belgium, and others which have deployed troops to UNIFIL might be concerned that a designation could destabilize the country further, putting their own military forces more at risk.

In spite of the factors described above, there are still clearly a number of European countries which favor an EU designation of Hezbollah. For example, the Dutch now support banning Hezbollah, and are the only EU country which has designated the entire organization domestically. The Dutch view on Hezbollah changed, in the wake of the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by an Islamic extremist. According to their 2004 annual intelligence report, the Dutch discovered in the course of their stepped up counterterrorism investigations that “Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one coordinating council,” and that therefore “there is indeed a link between these parts of the organization.” Germany, which has identified 900 Hezbollah supporters in its territory, reportedly also favors an EU ban. The United Kingdom, where Hezbollah’s military wing has been proscribed since 2003, has also pushed for action by the EU.

A Non-Transparent Process: Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess exactly where each of the European member states stand on a Hezbollah ban. While France has stated its position publicly, few other countries have followed France’s lead. The process for adding and removing names from the terrorist list is done in secret by a committee which generally meets biannually, and there are no records of these proceedings. Even when groups are added to the list, there is no explanation as to why this action was taken.

When asked about the EU’s failure to add Hezbollah, an EU spokeswoman merely stated that “the group makes its deliberations in a very discrete way,” and that “we are not able to assess the reasons why such unanimity could not be reached.” In fact, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana muddied the waters further in 2006 on exactly why Hezbollah is not on the list, when he proclaimed that the real reason was that there was not “sufficient data” to take this action.

In these secretive proceedings, it is hardly surprising that questionable negotiations occur on individual designations. For example, according to the German publication Der Spiegel, the United Kingdom opposed a proposal to remove the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group, from the EU’s list. In response, some other EU member states then blocked the UK’s request to add Hezbollah.

There may be some movement in the EU to make the process somewhat more transparent, in response to a recent judgment by an EU court. In December 2006, the court ruled that the European Council had illegally listed the MEK. In reaching its finding, the court faulted the council for failing to provide MEK with adequate reason or sufficient information on the basis of the designation. The EU is currently deliberating how to respond to this opinion, and what changes should be made to the designation process.

Why a Hezbollah Ban would be Important

Symbolic Impact: An EU designation of Hezbollah would have both symbolic and practical implications. First, it would send an important message to Hezbollah that they cannot have it both ways: they cannot engage in terrorist activity, but still be considered and treated as a legitimate political party. As terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman noted, “Our problem is that Hezbollah’s path to legitimacy has been purchased with the blood of over 300 dead Americans, and the model that its leaders are now actively seeking to export challenges the axiom that terrorism doesn’t work. As long as the Hezbollah model goes unchallenged, we’ll have no hope of persuading other aggrieved groups that terror is a repugnant and useless tool for gaining legitimate political power.”

Financial Impact: An EU ban would also have a more tangible effect, particularly in terms of Hezbollah’s European fundraising activities. According to Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, the effect of this action would be devastating. In a widely quoted 2005 interview, Nasrallah commented that an EU ban would ““destroy” the organization as “[t]he sources of our funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material support will be destroyed.”

While Nasrallah may be somewhat overstating the likely impact, Hezbollah does have reason to be nervous. Until now, Europe has been a permissive operating environment for the group, in large part because there were no EU-wide little restrictions. If Hezbollah were designated, all EU member states would be required to freeze any of the group’s assets within their jurisdiction, and all European financial institutions would be prohibited from processing any Hezbollah-related transactions.

Furthermore, the European member states have far greater capabilities to bring to bear on terrorist financing than they did prior to 9/11. The Europeans have heeded the call of UN Security Council resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001, which required countries to take a variety of steps to combat terrorist financing. In addition to establishing the EU terrorist lists, European countries have also: created or designated specific government agencies to lead the counterterrorist financing efforts; criminalized terrorist financing; and developed systems to freeze assets, among other changes. For example, Spain established the Commission for the Activities of Terrorist Funding, and France now appoints an economic and financial investigating judge to assist the anti-terrorism magistrate in terrorist financing cases.

The EU and its member states have also been active participants in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international, Paris-based organization responsible for setting global standards on combating money laundering and terrorism financing. The European Commission (the EU’s bureaucratic arm) and a number of European countries are among the 33 members of FATF. Perhaps as a result, Europe has been among the leaders in implementing FATF’s nine “special recommendations” to combat terrorist financing.

In addition to the changes made by the European governments, many of which are described above, the European private sector has also taken on greater responsibility in addressing terrorist financing. For example, based on the FATF recommendations, European financial institutions are subject to various “know your customer” requirements and must report suspicious financial transactions which might be indicative of terrorist financing.

Relatedly, all of the EU’s 27 member states have Financial Intelligence Units (FIU), and are part of the global FIU network, the Egmont Group. FIUs are centralized, national agencies responsible for detecting and fighting terrorism financing and money laundering. An FIU’s primary functions, as defined by Egmont, are to receive, analyze, and disseminate information about suspicious financial activity in the unit’s respective country. FIUs are supposed to share this information not only with law enforcement in their own countries, but also with other units throughout the world. In the view of FATF, having a fully functioning FIU is an important component of an effective counterterrorism financing regime.

International Efforts Against Iran: While the Europeans are growing more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran, to this point this has not correlated in increased focus on Hezbollah. Attempting to understand the Iranian threat, however, without including Hezbollah in the calculation is missing an important part of the picture. According to the US Director of National Intelligence, terrorism is a “key element” of Iran’s national strategy, and Hezbollah “at the center” of this strategy. Incidentally, as my colleague Matthew Levitt explained in his testimony, there have even been occasions when Iran has transferred funds to Hezbollah through Europe.

Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence: Of course, for a ban to have great impact, the EU member states would then have to step up their law enforcement and intelligence efforts against Hezbollah to get a better handle on its European activities. Once Hezbollah is officially recognized as a terrorist entity though, member states may be more likely to increase the resources and attention that they devote to investigating the organization. In addition, European countries will be far more likely to assist one another in Hezbollah-related investigations. In fact, the EU urges its member states to “fully exploit” the powers granted by the EU in the course of their investigations or prosecutions of designated entities.

An EU ban will likely be particularly effective in member states which have taken steps to criminalize the EU’s list. While the EU requires countries to take administrative actions – such as freezing assets – against those on its list, some member states have gone further, and adopted related criminal penalties. For example, in Finland, a person who violates the sanctions regulations can be criminally charged, while in the United Kingdom, a 2006 order provides for criminal enforcement of the list.

What would it take for Europe to Ban Hezbollah?

Given the lack of transparency in the European designation process, it is difficult to determine what it will take for the Europeans to achieve consensus on this issue. It is not entirely clear, for example, whether countries such as Spain and Belgium are merely following France’s lead in opposing a ban, or strongly hold this position independently. Should France shift its long-standing opposition, it is hard to know to what extent these countries will still be willing to defend this stance.

In any event, the Europeans are unlikely to move forward on a Hezbollah designation as long as they do not regard the organization as a direct threat. In this regard, the Europeans must recognize that while Hezbollah has not carried out attacks in Europe for a number of years, this could change rapidly. Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Europe and its ties to Iran give it the capability to quickly ramp up and carry out an attack should the perceived need arise.

In fact, in their 2005-2006 annual report, the United Kingdom’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) posed a scenario which could lead down this path. The ISC noted that if the diplomatic negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program deteriorate, Iran might respond by unleashing its terrorist proxies–perhaps against UK interests.

There is little doubt that if Iran instructed Hezbollah to conduct an attack, that Hezbollah would follow through. A quote by Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah helps illustrate this point. Nasrallah once told his senior leaders that he would even “divorce his wife” if the Iranian supreme leader told him to do so.

Conclusion

As the Europeans have learned firsthand, accommodation is not often an effective strategy with terrorist organizations. There are several examples worth noting. In the early 1990s, the French decided that they should not aggressively crack down on the Algerian terrorist groups, and risk provoking them. After suffering a number of attacks at the hands of these groups, however, the French concluded that the strategy was not working. In response, they shifted their approach and adopted a far more aggressive domestic counterterrorism approach – an approach they still utilize today.

Prior to 9/11, the United Kingdom was also regarded as somewhat of a sanctuary for terrorists. In fact, the French frequently referred to London as “Londonistan” to reflect their views on the United Kingdom’s tolerance for radical Islamists. A former British Special Branch officer stated that there was actually an explicit agreement between the government and the jihadists: “There was a deal with these guys. We told them if you don’t cause us any problems, then we won’t bother you.” After 9/11, the British realized that this strategy was no longer viable. To address this situation, they overhauled their counterterrorism efforts, making legislative changes, increasing their prioritization of counterterrorism, and utilizing a more aggressive law enforcement approach.

Germany also made a number of significant changes in response to the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, it was not a crime in Germany to be a member of a foreign terrorist organization, making it in some respects a logical place to plot an attack against a foreign country, such as the US. Indeed, the German government would have had a difficult time prosecuting the 9/11 plot members in Hamburg, even had German authorities discovered the plan prior to the attacks. After 9/11, the Germans amended this law, among other counterterrorism changes, to ensure that the country could no longer serve as a sanctuary for international terrorist organizations.

While there are certainly important distinctions between Hezbollah and al Qaeda type jihadists, the European should at least consider their prior experiences in deciding whether to blacklist Hezbollah. In weighing the likely benefits of a Hezbollah designation as well as the potential dangers of inaction, it should then be clear to the Europeans that banning Hezbollah is a necessary and productive step forward.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tom Lantos, Chairman
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5021

Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building . Date: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Time: 1:00 PM Subject: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Witnesses:

***Mr. Michael Jacobson
Senior Fellow
Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy
The Washington Institute

Mr. Alexander Ritzmann
Senior Fellow
European Foundation for Democracy

Mr. James Phillips
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

***NOTE: Please be advised that the witness list has changed.

Statement before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

June 20, 2007
Chairman Wexler, ranking member Gallegly, members of the committee, thank you very much for the invitation to speak to you today. It is a real pleasure and an honor to be here.

The mission of the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD), where I serve as a senior fellow, is to defend democratic values, promote freedom, and counter the ideologies that drive terrorism.

Based in Brussels, EFD works closely with European institutions as well as with individuals across the ethnic and political spectrum. In addition to supporting democracy and freedom around the world, our efforts also focus on the rule of law, gender equality, minority rights and independent judiciaries.

EFD and our partners at a European and transatlantic level support liberal democrats throughout the world who call for reform and condemn radical or violent ideologies.

Allow me a few words about Hezbollah in Europe. During the time that I was a member of the Berlin state Parliament, I became increasingly concerned about the growth of Hezbollah not only in Germany but throughout Europe.

Hezbollah arrived in the European Union in the 1980s, along with refugees from the civil war in Lebanon. Despite its deadly track record and a 2005 European Parliament resolution recommending the banning of the Iranian-funded group, it is still legal on the Continent. France, Spain, Belgium and Sweden prevent the EU from jointly designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

Although it is closely monitored by German law enforcement and intelligence, Hezbollah enjoys significant operational freedom. In the late 1990s, for example, it was able to recruit in Germany Steven Smyrek, a German convert to Islam, and train him in Lebanon as a suicide bomber. He was luckily arrested at the Tel Aviv airport before he could blow up Israeli civilians.

German security services believe that about 900 Hezbollah activists are in the country and regularly meet in 30 cultural community centers and mosques. These activists financially support Hezbollah in Lebanon through fund-raising organizations, such as the “Orphans Project Lebanon Association.” This harmless-sounding charity belongs to the Lebanese al-Shahid (the Martyr) Association, which is part of the Hezbollah network that supports the families of militia fighters and suicide bombers.

According to a German government report from February, the attitude of Hezbollah supporters in Germany “is characterized by a far-reaching, unlimited acceptance of the ideology and policy (of Hezbollah).” Berlin is also aware that representatives of Hezbollah’s “foreign affairs office” in Lebanon regularly travel to Germany to give orders to their followers.

So why does the German government tolerate these activities?

First, the Hezbollah leadership in Beirut recognizes the value of a German safe haven, along with other countries in Europe where Hezbollah acts with impunity. Hezbollah members carefully obey most German laws. But experience from attacks in the U.S., Britain and elsewhere suggest, however, that terrorists follow the law up and until the point they decide to strike. I would add that the most likely scenario for Hezbollah carrying out attacks in Europe is not a sudden surprise attack by Hezbollah members but rather a) Hezbollah used as a retaliatory force following serious action against Iran; or, b) Hezbollah adopting a threatening posture on Iran’s behalf.

Second, too many German policymakers uncritically accept the idea that there is a political Hezbollah — an Islamist but legitimate movement independent of those Hezbollah terrorists who have murdered hundreds of people around the world. They do this at their own peril and even ignore Hezbollah’s own words. As Mohammed Fannish, member of the so-called political bureau of Hezbollah and former Lebanese energy minister, put it in 2002: “I can state that there is no separating between Hezbollah’s military and political arms.”

Hezbollah’s leadership, the Shurah Council, controls the totality of its activities — social, political and what it calls “military.” Funding for Hezbollah is fungible: Money collected in Germany supposedly for social and political causes frees up funds for terrorist attacks.

In ignoring the threat from Hezbollah and the scope of its operations, the German government – and other European countries – are putting hope above experience. In the end, this approach compromises the safety of European citizens.

For example, on July 31, 2006, two Lebanese students, Yussuf Mohammed El Hajdib and Jihad Hamad, placed bombs hidden in suitcases on two regional trains in Germany, but they failed to go off. Germany’s federal law enforcement agency concluded that a successful explosion would have resulted in a tragedy on par with the London subway attacks of July 2005. The two suspects said they wanted to take revenge for the Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammed.

Just four month earlier, on a broadcast reaching all of Europe, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly urged Muslims on Hezbollah’s TV-station Al-Manar “to take a decisive stand” in the cartoon controversy (see details below). While the German federal prosecutor is still investigating the organizational affiliations of these two Lebanese terror suspects, it is clear that the role of Al-Manar as a tool of incitement, fundraising and recruitment for Hezbollah is a significant security problem in Europe.

The following questions regarding this hearing’s topic of “Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List” will be addressed in my testimony today.

1) Why is it important for the European Union (EU) to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list?

2) How does the EU designation process work?

3) What is the impact of a designation?

4) Why is Hezbollah not yet a designated terrorist organization by the EU?

5) What can be done to encourage Hezbollah’s designation as a terrorist entity by the EU?

1) Why is it important for the European Union (EU) to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list?

a) Hezbollah is a threat to EU interests

Hezbollah has been actively involved in terrorism ever since its creation in 1982. Hezbollah is known internationally for its kidnappings, hijackings and bombings against U.S. and European interests and its ongoing attacks against Israel. Before turning to Hezbollah’s threat against the EU specifically, I would note a) that Hezbollah has struck Western targets, such as the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the American embassy in Beirut in September 1984. In the mid-1980s, Hezbollah kidnapped a large number of Americans in Lebanon, and caused the death of several—including CIA station chief William Buckley and American University of Beirut librarian Peter Kilburn; b) in the 1990s, Hezbollah went international, with attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets in Argentina, and evidence suggesting that Hezbollah tried to carry out attacks on Jewish/Israeli targets in London, Thailand, and Singapore.

Hezbollah has also proven in the past that it is willing and capable of striking within the EU. In the 1980s and 1990s Hezbollah killed French peacekeeping forces in Beirut and carried out bombings in France and Spain as well as assassinations in Germany and Italy.

Hezbollah operates networks for funding, recruitment, training and logistics in many of the EU member states and has used EU territory as a launching pad from which operatives infiltrate into Israel to conduct surveillance and carry out attacks.

Hezbollah has been credited with inventing the modern use of ’suicide bombing’, and is openly providing training, funding and logistics to HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad which are designated terrorist organizations by the EU.

b) Hezbollah radicalizes Muslim communities in the EU

Hezbollah activists and propaganda outlets spread a consistent message of hate against Western values and encourage violent jihad as means to act on these sentiments. As I have noted, it broadcasts anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism and incitement against the West in the EU through its TV station Al Manar and various websites. Hezbollah’s hate propaganda includes calls of “Death to America,” “Death to Israel,” the glorification of martyrdom and the dehumanization of Israelis as well as of Jews.

To give a typical example, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the following in context of the cartoon controversy in 2006 which was broadcasted repeatedly by Al-Manar:

“If any Muslim had carried out the fatwa of Imam Khomeini against the apostate Salman Rushdie, those despicable people would not have dared to insult the Prophet Muhammad - not in Denmark, not in Norway, and not in France… I call upon …all the Muslims to take a decisive stand… I am certain that not only millions, but hundreds of millions, of Muslims are ready and willing to sacrifice their lives in order to defend the honor of their Prophet. And you are among them.”

Interviews of radicalized Muslim youth on German television have shown that they use Al-Manar TV as their primary source of information.

The incitement broadcast on Al-Manar has received the attention of members of Congress, the US Administration, European legislators, and European audiovisual authorities, working with non-governmental organizations including the Coalition Against Terrorist Media (CATM), comprised of Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and secular organizations, including my organization, the European Foundation for Democracy and the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies. As a result of these efforts, Al Manar was dropped from four European satellite providers — Spanish, Dutch and two French — to enforce the European Union’s Television Without Frontiers directive against “incitement to racial and/or religious hatred.”

The US Treasury Department has designated Al-Manar a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity. Four other satellite providers — US, Brazilian, Australian and one Hong-Kong based provider — terminated broadcasting of the station and multinational advertisers ceased almost $2 million in annual advertising on the station. Al-Manar, however, is still broadcasting into Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa from its two remaining satellite providers, the Egyptian-based Nilesat and the Saudi-based ARABSAT. If European countries want to send a strong message to these satellite providers and the countries that host them that incitement to violence broadcasting into living rooms throughout Europe is unacceptble, the designation of Hezbollah is an important first step.

Although there have been no more Hezbollah attacks in the EU in recent years, the organization maintains its capability to carry out such attacks. As I have noted, Hezbollah’s operational-terrorist capability also constitutes a potential weapon in the hands of the Iranian regime, which it can utilize in the future in line with “strategic considerations” e.g., in advance or in response to a US or an Israeli offensive against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

2) How does the EU designation process work?

The decision on whether or not to include or remove an individual or an organization on the EU list of terrorist organizations is made by the Council of Ministers. Individual cases are examined by the “Clearing House,” a technical working group of the Council of Ministers comprised of national experts from law enforcement and judicial authorities as well as intelligence services. Which bodies are represented depends on the individual member states and on how they are structured. According to the rules, evidence for ongoing terrorist activities has to be presented. The decisions to include organizations or individuals for designation are revised every six months. Details about the actual members of the Clearing House and on what grounds individuals or entities finally become listed or not remain classified. All decisions relating to the EU terrorist list have to be made by the unanimous agreement of the 27 EU member states.

In short, the Clearning House process’s lack of transparency and the requirement for consensus on the part of all 27 EU members make designation an important though difficult goal but one that should be considered as part of a fuller list of options to hinder Hezbollah’s operations in Europe.

3) What would be the impact of a designation?

An EU designation would permit the European Union and member states to initiate a process of “freezing the funds and other financial assets or economic resources” of Hezbollah; EU member states could “ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services will not be made available, directly or indirectly,” for the benefit of Hezbollah.

Although observers believe that Hezbollah receives annual support of about $100 million from Iran, the designation of Hezbollah by the EU would be a significant step in the effort to stem the group’s international financial activity. In 2005 Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah spelled out the consequences of a designation by the European Union: “The sources of funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material support will be destroyed.”

4) Why is Hezbollah not yet a designated terrorist organization by the EU?

There are several points to be made about why Hezbollah has not yet been designated a terrorist orgnization by the EU.

While Britain and Germany have lobbied for the EU to include Hezbollah on its terrorist list, other European counties - notably France, Sweden, Greece, Spain, Italy and Belgium - have opposed the idea. There is, however, contradicting information available about the actual position of other EU member states regarding this question.

Even while the E.U. has not designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, several member countries have taken action on their own.

On May 3, 2002, the EU placed several individual Hezbollah terrorists, including Hezbollah’s “Senior Intelligence Officer” and head of international operations Imad Mugniyah on its terrorist list.

In 2004 the Netherlands designated Hezbollah a terrorist organization, concluding “that Hezbollah’s political and terrorist wings are controlled by one coordinating council. This means, the Dutch government concluded, that “there is indeed a link between these parts of the organization. The Netherlands has changed its policy and no longer makes a distinction between the political and terrorist Hezbollah branches.”

The United Kingdom designated Hezbollah’s external security organization as a terrorist entity.

In Aug 2006, the Finnish Presidency of the EU stated: “The EU will not for the time being put the Islamist Hezbollah movement on its blacklist of terrorist organizations but the discussion could re-emerge in the future.”

On 10 March 2005 the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution recognizing “clear evidence” of “terrorist activities by Hezbollah. The EU Council should take all necessary steps to curtail them.” The EU Council, however, has refused to act yet.

The key arguments brought forward by those opposing Hezbollah’s designation as a terrorist organization are that:

A) The designation would destabilize Lebanon and the Middle East peace process.

B) Hezbollah is a legitimate resistance movement against Israeli occupation, not a terrorist organization.

C) Hezbollah, the “Party of God”, is a legitimate political party with separate political, social and military wings.

Allow me to examine these hypotheses:

Destabilizing Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process
Hezbollah has been identified as a key destabilizing factor in Lebanon. Amongst its stated objectives are the establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Lebanon, the destruction of Israel and the elimination of Western influences from the region. Taking those objectives into consideration, it seems extremly unlikely that Hezbollah is interested in stabilizing the fragile pluralistic political system in Lebanon. Regarding the broader Middle East peace process, Hezbollah has openly opposed any peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel and called former PLO chairman Yassir Arafat a traitor to the Palestinian cause. In 2005 the Palestinian Authority called for Hezbollah’s designation as a terrorist organization by the EU as the PA regarded the organization as the single most dangerous threat to the peace process.

Hezbollah is a resistance movement against Israeli occupation
Hezbolah claims that it is a resistance movement fighting against Israel. Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah now claims that Israel still occupies the so-called Sheba farms. According to the United Nations, however, Israel has fully withdrawn from Lebanese territory. Even Syria, Hezbollah’s sponsor, claims that the Sheba farms are Syrian not Lebanese territory. The Sheba farms claim is not plausible.

Hezbollah is a legitimate political party
According to its own words Hezbollah is not a political party. In an interview granted on April 16, 2007 to Al-Kawthar, an Iranian TV channel, Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hassan Nasrallah’s deputy, explained that Hezbollah was founded and commenced activities in 1982, based on a religious ruling made by Iranian Imam Khomeini, who considered jihad against Israel to be an Islamic religious duty. Qassem also stressed that Hezbollah’s policy of terrorist operations against Israel (including suicide bombings and rocket fire) requires jurisprudent permission of the Iranian leadership.

As I have noted, Muhammad Fannish, member of the political bureau of Hezbollah and former Lebanese energy minister stated: “… there is no separating between Hezbollah’s military and political branch.” Hezbollah’s leadership, the Shurah council, controlls all its activities, whether they are social, political or military.

The broad support of Hezbollah within the Shiite Muslim community in Lebanon seems to be strongly related to its social and economic activities. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted in March 2006:

“Hezbollah currently operates at least four hospitals, 12 clinics, 12 schools and two agricultural centers. It also has an environmental department and an extensive social assistance program. Medical care is also cheaper than in most of the country’s private hospitals and free for Hezbollah members.”

Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, a professor at American University in Beirut, characterized Hezbollah in the following terms: “Hezbollah is first and foremost a jihadi movement that engages in politics, and not a political party that conducts jihad.”

In addition to the considerations above which have been used in arguing against the designation of Hezbollah, some EU member states remain reluctant to confront Hezobllah for fear of potential retaliation of Hezbollah against their UNIFIL soldiers in Lebanon or even civilian targets at home. Other member states do not feel affected or threatened by Hezbollah and feel little urgency to act. The different interests and perceptions of the problem within the EU membership make achieving unanimity very difficult.

5) What can be done to encourage Hezbollah’s designation as a terrorist entity by the EU?

To achieve its objective of convincing the EU to designate Hezbollah, the U.S. should apply pressure in a low profile manner refraining from publicly criticizing European leaders. A more effective approach is to work with select European allies and to provide additional information, intelligence and constructive arguments that these allies can use within Europe. The Hezbollah threat must be perceived as a threat to EU interests and not just a US priority. This can be accomplished by identifying and working with European experts who can shed light on Hezbollah’s activities and bring a deeper understanding of how Hezbollah uses Europe as a base for terrorism to European policymakers and the European public.

As noted earlier, the Clearing House process is an important one, but requires the consensus of 27 countries in order for Hezbollah to be designated. As such the U.S. ought to assume a two- step process. The process would focus both on getting consensus by member countries to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and would encourage each country to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization within their own governments.

It is important to note there that many of the EU countries do not have a mechanism to designate organizations as terrorist entities – even though such a mechanism is required under UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The U.S. ought to work with them to establish such mechanisms and as well as appropriate targeted sanctions regimes.

Other actions the U.S. should consider include:

Establishing a transatlantic working group on Hezbollah comprised of legislators from the subcommittee and their counterparts from EU national governments and the EU parliament.

Legislating the provision of regular reports about Hezbollah criminal and terrorist activity by Congress and encouraging similar reports by EU legislators, security officials and the intelligence community.

Calling on European government and counterterrorism officials and experts to appear before the working group to testify on why Hezbollah should be designated.

From my experience, the German government has shown strong resolve when it saw a threat to German security. It banned the Hamas “charity” al-Aqsa as well as the radical Sunni Islamist Hizb-ut Tahrir group. And it joined the EU in designating both HAMAS, as well as the PKK, the radical Kurdish group, as terrorist organizations.

Would branding the “Party of God” a terrorist group make any difference? Let me come back to the words of Nasrallah himself: European blacklisting would “destroy Hezbollah. The sources of our funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material support will be destroyed.”

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee and am grateful that you have given me the chance to share a perspective from Europe. While you will find many who do not share my view on the importance of designating Hezbollah, in my experience, once European leaders and the general population considers this more thoroughly, you will find partners who understand the need to address this serious threat.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tom Lantos, Chairman
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5021

Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building . Date: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Time: 1:00 PM Subject: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Witnesses:

***Mr. Michael Jacobson
Senior Fellow
Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy
The Washington Institute

Mr. Alexander Ritzmann
Senior Fellow
European Foundation for Democracy

Mr. James Phillips
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

***NOTE: Please be advised that the witness list has changed.

Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat to the European Union

Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe

June 20, 2007

James Phillips

Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies

The Heritage Foundation

Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat to the European Union

Hezbollah (“Party of God”), the radical Lebanon-based Shiite revolutionary movement poses a clear terrorist threat to international security. Hezbollah terrorists have murdered Americans, Israelis, Lebanese, Europeans and the citizens of many other nations. Originally founded in 1982, this Lebanese group has evolved from a local menace into a global terrorist network strongly backed by radical regimes in Iran and Syria, and funded by a web of charitable organizations, criminal activities, and front companies.

Hezbollah regards terrorism not only as a useful tool for advancing its revolutionary agenda but as a religious duty as part of a “global jihad.” It helped to introduce and popularize the horrific tactic of suicide bombings in Lebanon in the 1980s, developed a strong guerrilla force and a political apparatus in the 1990s, and became a major destabilizing influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the last decade.

Hezbollah murdered more Americans than any other terrorist group before September 11, 2001. Despite al-Qaeda’s increased visibility since then, Hezbollah remains a bigger, better equipped, better organized, and potentially more dangerous terrorist organization, in part because it enjoys the unstinting support of the two chief state sponsors of terrorism in the world today: Iran and Syria. Hezbollah’s threat potential led former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to dub it “the A team of terrorism.”

Hezbollah is a cancer that has metastasized, expanding its operations from Lebanon, first to strike regional targets in the Middle East, then far beyond. It now is truly a global terrorist threat that draws financial and logistical support from the Lebanese Shiite diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, North America, and South America. Hezbollah fundraising and equipment procurement cells have been detected and broken up in the United States and Canada. Europe is believed to contain many more of these cells.

Hezbollah has been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks against Americans, including:

The April 18, 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut Lebanon, which killed 63 people, including 17 Americans.

The October 23, 1983 suicide truck bombing of the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport, which killed 241 Marines deployed as part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

The September 20, 1984 bombing of the US embassy annex in Lebanon.

The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 American servicemen stationed in Saudi Arabia.

Hezbollah also was involved in the kidnapping of several dozen Westerners, including 14 Americans, who were held as hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s. The American hostages eventually became pawns that Iran used as leverage in the secret negotiations that led to the Iran Contra affair in the mid-1980s.

Hezbollah has launched numerous attacks at far flung targets outside the Middle East. Hezbollah perpetrated the two deadliest terrorist attacks in the history of South America: the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina which killed 29 people and the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 96 people. The trial of those implicated in the 1994 bombing revealed an extensive Hezbollah presence in Argentina and other countries in South America. Hezbollah also was involved in aborted attempts to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand in 1994 and in a failed plot in Singapore.

Hezbollah’s terrorist threat in Europe

Hezbollah poses a direct threat to EU citizens at home and those traveling abroad, especially in the Middle East. Hezbollah established a presence inside European countries in the 1980s amid the influx of Lebanese citizens seeking to escape Lebanon’s brutal civil war and recurring clashes between Israel and Palestinian terrorists based in Lebanese refugee camps. Hezbollah took root among Lebanese Shiite immigrant communities throughout Europe. German intelligence officials estimate that roughly 900 Hezbollah members live in Germany alone. Hezbollah also has developed an extensive web of fundraising and logistical support cells spread throughout Europe.

France and Britain have been the principal European targets of Hezbollah terrorism, in part because both countries opposed Hezbollah’s agenda in Lebanon and both were perceived to be enemies of Iran, Hezbollah’s chief patron. Hezbollah has been involved in many terrorist attacks against Europeans, including:

The October 1983 bombing of the French contingent of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon, on the same day as the U.S. Marine barracks bombing, which killed 58 French soldiers.

The December 1983 bombing of the French Embassy in Kuwait.

The April 1985 bombing of a restaurant near a U.S. base in Madrid, Spain, which killed 18 Spanish citizens.

A campaign of 13 bombings in France in 1986 that targeted shopping centers and railroad facilities, killing 13 people and wounding more than 250.

A March 1989 attempt to assassinate British novelist Salman Rushdie failed when a bomb exploded prematurely, killing a terrorist in London.

Hezbollah attacks in Europe trailed off in the 1990s, after Hezbollah’s Iranian sponsors accepted a truce in their bloody 1980-1988 war with Iraq and no longer needed a surrogate to punish states that Tehran perceived to be supporting Iraq. But this lull could quickly come to an end if the situation changes in Lebanon or Iran is embroiled in another conflict. Significantly, the participation of European troops in Lebanese peacekeeping operations, which became a lightning rod for Hezbollah terrorist attacks in the 1980s, again could become an issue today, as Hezbollah attempts to revive its aggressive operations in southern Lebanon. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden have contributed troops to the UNIFIL peacekeeping force. Troops from EU member states may then find themselves attacked by Hezbollah with weapons financed by Hezbollah’s supporters in their home countries.

Hezbollah operatives are deployed throughout Europe according to intelligence officials, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Hezbollah’s Radicalizing Influence on European Muslims

Europe’s vacation from Hezbollah terrorist attacks could come to a swift end if Hezbollah succeeds in its attempts to convert European Muslims to its harsh ideology. Young Muslim militants in Berlin, asked in a television interview to explain their hatred of the United States and Jews, cited Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV as one of their main sources of information. Ideas have consequences. In July 2006, four months after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in an interview broadcast on al-Manar TV, called for Muslims to take a decisive stand against the Danish cartoons featuring the prophet Mohammed, two Lebanese students sought to bomb two trains in Germany as a reprisal for the cartoons, but the bombs failed to detonate.

Clearly, Europeans are exposing themselves to increased risks of terrorism as long as they allow Hezbollah’s political and propaganda apparatus to spew a witch’s brew of hatred, incitement, and calls for vengeance.

Hezbollah’s Role as a Proxy for Iran

Hezbollah is a close ally, frequent surrogate, and terrorist subcontractor for Iran’s revolutionary Islamic regime. Iran played a crucial role in creating Hezbollah in 1982 as a vehicle for exporting its revolution, mobilizing Lebanese Shia, and developing a terrorist surrogate for attacks on Iran’s enemies. Tehran provides the bulk of Hezbollah’s foreign support: arms, training, logistical support and money. Iran provides at least $100 million and probably closer to $200 million of annual support for Hezbollah, and has lavishly stocked Hezbollah’s expensive and extensive arsenal of Katyusha rockets, sophisticated mines, small arms, ammunition, explosives, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that Hezbollah can use for aerial surveillance or remotely-piloted terrorist attacks. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have trained Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and in Iran.

Iran has used Hezbollah as a club to hit not only Israel and its Western enemies, but also many Arab countries. Iran’s revolutionary ideology has fed its hostility to other Muslim governments, which it seeks to overthrow and replace with radical allies. Iran used Hezbollah to launch terrorist attacks against Iraqi targets, and against Arab states that sided with Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq war. Hezbollah launched numerous terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which extended strong financial support to Iraq’s war effort, and participated in several other terrorist operations in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Iranian officials conspired with the Saudi branch of Hezbollah to conduct the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Today, Hezbollah continues to cooperate with Iranian Revolutionary Guards to destabilize Iraq, where both help train and equip the Mahdi Army, the radical anti-Western Shiite militia led by the militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

By refusing to use its economic leverage over Iran to dissuade Tehran from continuing its troubling nuclear weapons program, the EU is making a military clash between the United States and Iran much more likely. In that event, Hezbollah cells throughout Europe are likely to be activated to strike at American and perhaps NATO targets. Even if Hezbollah elects to restrict its focus to American embassies, businesses, and tourists, many Europeans are likely to perish in such attacks.

Hezbollah’s Ties with Other Terrorist Groups

In addition to the direct threat Hezbollah poses to Europeans, it also poses an indirect threat by virtue of its collaboration with other terrorist groups that have targeted Europeans. Many of these groups already have been place on the EU terrorism list.

Hezbollah has developed a cooperative relationship on an ad hoc basis with the al-Qaeda terrorist network and several radical Palestinian groups. In June 2002 U.S. and European

Intelligence officials noted that Hezbollah was “increasingly teaming up with al-Qaeda on logistics and training for terrorist operations.” Both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah established training bases in Sudan after the 1989 coup that brought the radical National Islamic Front to power. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, which also established a strong presence in Sudan to support the Sudanese regime, ran several training camps for Arab radical Islamic groups there, and may have facilitated cooperative efforts between the two terrorist groups.

Another worrisome web of cooperation between Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and Hamas support networks is flourishing in the tri-border region at the juncture of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. This lawless and corrupt region has provided lucrative opportunities for Hezbollah supporters to raise funds, launder money, obtain fraudulent documents, pass counterfeit currency and smuggle drugs, arms, and people.

Modern terrorist networks often are comprised of loosely organized transnational webs of autonomous cells, which help them to defeat the efforts of various law enforcement, intelligence, and internal security agencies to dismantle them. This decentralized structure also helps to conceal the hand of state sponsors who seek to use terrorist groups for their own ends while minimizing the risk of retaliation from states targeted by the terrorists.

The amorphous non-hierarchical nature of the networks, and their linkages with cooperative criminal networks, leads to a situation in which some nodes of the web function as part of more than one terrorist group. This cross-pollination of terrorist networks makes it difficult to determine where one terrorist group ends and another one begins. Therefore, giving Hezbollah a free pass to operate inside the European Union also aids other groups who are plugged into the same web of criminal gangs, family enterprises, or clan networks.

In 2002, Germany closed down a charitable fundraising organization, the al-Aqsa Fund, which reportedly was a Hamas front that also raised money for Hezbollah. Hezbollah also has colluded with al-Qaeda affiliates in Asia. Abdul Nasser Nooh assisted both Hezbollah and al-Qaeda activities and Muhammad Amed al-Khalifa, a Hezbollah member, was involved in sending a shipment of explosives to the Philippines through an al-Qaeda front company.

According to U.S. intelligence officials, Hezbollah has cooperated with the terrorist network formerly led by the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed in Iraq in 2006. This network officially became part of al-Qaeda in 2004. Despite Zarqawi’s militantly anti-Shia views, the two groups have reportedly coordinated terrorist efforts against Israel on an ad hoc basis. Zarqawi’s network, comprised of Sunni extremists from the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and other countries, has a strong fundraising and support infrastructure in Europe that poses a significant threat to Europeans as well as citizens of a wide range of other countries.

In the Middle East, Hezbollah has cooperated with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to launch terrorist attacks against Israelis. After the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000, Hezbollah’s notorious terrorism coordinator, Imad Mugniyah, was selected by Iran to assist Palestinian terrorist operations against Israel. Mugniyah reportedly played a role in facilitating the shipment of 50 tons of Iranian arms and military supplies to Palestinian militants on board the freighter Karine A, which was intercepted by Israeli naval forces in the Red Sea in January 2002 before its cargo could be delivered. Hezbollah has also provided Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups with technical expertise for suicide bombing.

Hezbollah’s Destabilizing Influence in the Middle East

Hezbollah threatens the security and stability of the Middle East, and European interests in the Middle East, on a number of fronts. In addition to its murderous campaign against Israel, Hezbollah seeks to violently impose its totalitarian agenda and subvert democracy in Lebanon. Although some experts believed that Hezbollah’s participation in the 1992 Lebanese elections and subsequent inclusion in Lebanon’s parliament and coalition governments would moderate its behavior, its political inclusion brought only cosmetic changes.

After Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the September 2000 outbreak of fighting between Israelis and Palestinians, Hezbollah stepped up its support for Palestinian extremist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It also expanded its own operations in the West Bank and Gaza and provided funding for specific attacks launched by other groups.

In July 2006, Hezbollah forces crossed the internationally recognized border to kidnap Israeli soldiers inside Israel, igniting a military clash that claimed hundreds of lives and severely damaged the economies on both sides of the border. Hezbollah is rebuilding its depleted arsenal with financial support from its European fund-raising networks. This poses a threat to European soldiers in the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon. To be consistent, the E.U. should ban such fundraising.

Hezbollah uses Europe as a staging area and recruiting ground for infiltrating terrorists into Israel. Hezbollah has dispatched operatives to Israel from Europe to gather intelligence and execute terrorist attacks. Examples of Hezbollah operatives who have traveled to Israel from Europe include: Hussein Makdad, a Lebanese national, who used a forged British passport to enter Israel from Switzerland in 1996 and injured himself in a premature bomb explosion in his Jerusalem hotel room; Stefan Smirnak, a German convert to Islam who was trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, was arrested at Ben Gurion airport after flying to Israel in 1997; Fawzi Ayoub, a Canadian citizen of Lebanese descent, was arrested in 2000 after traveling to Israel on a boat from Europe; and Gerard Shuman, a dual Lebanese-British citizen, who was arrested in Israel in 2001.

Hezbollah Drug Smuggling

Long before al-Qaeda and the Taliban began to finance their operations using the profits of drug smuggling from Afghanistan, Hezbollah was a major supplier of illicit drugs to Europe and other regions. The organization tapped into longstanding smuggling networks operated by Shiite clans in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, a Hezbollah stronghold.

Hezbollah raises money from smuggling Lebanese opium, hashish, and heroin. It also traffics in illicit drugs in the Tri-border region of South America. Hezbollah cells also engage in other forms of criminal activity, such as credit card fraud, and trafficking in

“conflict diamonds” in Sierra Leone, Congo, and Liberia, to finance their activities.

The EU’s Ostrich-like Policy Regarding Hezbollah

The United States long has designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands have followed suit. The United Kingdom has placed the “Hezbollah External Security Organization” on its terrorist list. But the European Union has dragged its feet on taking serious action against Hezbollah.

In May 2002 the EU added 11 organizations and 7 individuals to its financial sanctions list for terrorism. This was the first time that the EU froze the assets of non-European terrorist groups. But it did not sanction Hezbollah as an organization – only several individual leaders, such as Imad Mugniyah.

By taking these half-measures, the EU mistakenly has embraced the fallacy that terrorist operations can be separated from the other activities of a radical organization. Attempts to compartmentalize the perceived threat by accepting the fiction that a “political wing” is qualitatively different from a “military wing” are self-defeating. This is a distinction without a difference.

Hezbollah’s raison d’etre is to violently impose its totalitarian ideology on muslims and forge a radical Islamic state determined to destroy Israel and drive out western and other non-Islamic influences in Muslim world. No genuine “political party” would finance suicide bombings and accumulate an arsenal of over 10,000 rockets to be indiscriminately launched at civilians in a neighboring country.

Agreeing to accept a false distinction between political and terrorist wings is also dangerous. It allows Hezbollah to continue raising money for violent purposes. Money is fungible. Funds raised in Europe, ostensibly to finance charitable and political causes, free up money to finance terrorist attacks, or can be diverted to criminal activities. The recent violent convulsion in Gaza and last summer’s war in Lebanon underscore the great dangers inherent in treating radical Islamic movements as normal political parties.

Hezbollah leaders themselves see little distinction between political and terrorist activity (which they consider to be “military” or “resistance” actions). Mohammed Raad, one of Hezbollah’s representatives in the Lebanese parliament, proclaimed in 2001: “Hezbollah is a military resistance party, and it is our task to fight the occupation of our land…There is no separation between politics and resistance.” In 2002, Mohammed Fannish, a Hezbollah political leader and former Lebanese Minister of Energy, declared: “I can state that there is no separating between Hezbollah military and political aims.”

The EU also excluded the fundraising network of Hamas from the terrorism list in 2002. But in August 2003 the EU reversed itself and classified all of Hamas as a terrorist organization. It is high time to do the same with Hezbollah.

Some Europeans may hope that by passively accepting Hezbollah’s fundraising activities that the EU can escape its terror. But this ostrich-like policy ignores the fact that fundraising cells easily can transform themselves into operational terror cells, if called on to do so. Hezbollah cells are like stem cells that can morph into other forms and take on new duties. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has warned that Hezbollah support cells inside the United States could also undertake terrorist attacks. The same is true in Europe.

Individual EU member states, such as France and Germany, have previously taken legal action against Hezbollah. Germany has deported Hezbollah operatives and France banned Hezbollah’s al-Manar television network in 2004. But such actions were undertaken in an ad hoc manner on a country by country basis, not in a systematic manner by the EU as a whole. Given that protecting citizens is the highest duty of the state, such half-hearted piecemeal policies are irresponsible.

Putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list would require the consent of all 27 EU member states. Such action would oblige each member to prohibit the channeling of money from European entities and individuals to Hezbollah, and to seize Hezbollah assets in the EU. On March 10, 2005, the EU Parliament voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolution that affirmed Hezbollah’s involvement in terrorist activities and ordered the EU Council to “take all necessary steps to curtail” Hezbollah.

But France, Spain, and Belgium have blocked action in recent years. French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier in February 2005 justified French opposition to declaring Hezbollah to be a terrorist group by saying: “Hezbollah has a parliamentary and political dimension in Lebanon. They have members of parliament who are participating in parliamentary life. As you know, political life in Lebanon is difficult and fragile.” But one major reason that life is so “difficult and fragile” in Lebanon is that Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, seeks to intimidate democratic forces in Lebanon through the use of terrorism. Taking a stand against Hezbollah not only would undermine its ability to finance terrorism against its Lebanese opponents, but would make life much less difficult in Lebanon in the long run.

Classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organization would significantly constrain its ability to operate in Europe and severely erode its ability to raise funds there and use European banks to transfer funds around the globe. All EU member states would be required to freeze Hezbollah assets and prohibit Hezbollah-related financial transactions. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah recognized the damage that this would do to his organization in a March 2005 interview aired on Hezbollah’s al-Manar television network: “the sources of [our] funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political, and material support will be destroyed.”

But France in particular has blocked action on taking the logical next step with Hezbollah. The recent election of Nicolas Sarkozy as France’s new president offers hope for a major shift in the French position. Sarkozy hopefully will replace Jacques Chirac’s “See No Evil” wishful thinking with a principled stand against permitting a lethal killing machine from infecting alienated European Muslims with its violent ideology, milking them of money to finance mass murder, and brainwashing them to become suicide bombers against a wide array of targets.

How can EU leaders be persuaded to take concerted and systematic action against Hezbollah?

First and foremost, they must understand that in the long run, this is the best way to protect their own people, the highest duty of government. Wishful thinking about inducing Hezbollah to stray from the fundamental tenets of its own ideology will compromise the security of EU citizens. Turning a blind eye to Hezbollah’s activities will only allow it to metastasize into a more deadly threat. Cracking down on Hezbollah activities would not only reduce the potential terrorist threat, but would reduce the threat of its ancillary activities, such as drug smuggling, criminal enterprises, and efforts to radicalize European Muslim communities.

Second, EU leaders can be criticized for the strained logic behind their current position. It makes little sense to designate individual Hezbollah leaders as terrorists, but continue to permit the organization to raise money for their deadly work. It is a mistake to exempt Hezbollah’s “political wing” from responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the “military wing” that executes its orders. Running a hospital or an orphanage does not absolve an organization for the murder of innocents. The EU must be proactive and uproot Hezbollah’s support infrastructure in Europe to curtail the activities of its terrorist thugs around the world.

Third, EU leaders should be asked to join the multilateral efforts of their democratic allies to protect all of their citizens from the attacks of totalitarian Islamic extremists. There is an ideological dimension to this conflict, as well as a terrorist dimension. It would be irresponsible for the EU to stay neutral in this global ideological struggle, given the presence of a growing Muslim population inside Europe that could fall prey to radical Islamic ideologies.

Banning Hezbollah also would be a step that would help stabilize the volatile Middle East and support Arab-Israeli peace efforts. Even the Palestinian Authority requested that the EU ban Hezbollah in 2005, complaining that Hezbollah was recruiting Palestinian suicide bombers to sabotage the tenuous truce with Israel.

Putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list also would help stabilize Lebanon. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, jointly sponsored by France and the U.S., calls for the disarming of all militias in Lebanon. Yet EU toleration of Hezbollah fundraising operations inside its own borders enables efforts to finance the purchase of arms and ammunition for the biggest and most dangerous militia in Lebanon. Adding Hezbollah to the EU terrorism list would be an important step toward disarming its militia and restoring the rule of law in Lebanon.

Banning Hezbollah also would contribute to the containment of Iran’s rising power. Tehran has used its Lebanese surrogate to advance its own radical foreign policy agenda in the past and is sure to do so again.

Congress has played a role in appealing for greater cooperation from the EU in curtailing Hezbollah’s activities. The House of Representatives in March 2005 passed H.Res. 101, which urged the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list. The Senate followed suit the next month. Congress should continue to press the EU to do the right thing regarding Hezbollah by passing further resolutions and holding hearings such as this one to educate EU leaders and their constituencies about the potential challenges posed by Hezbollah.

The EU can no longer afford to ignore Hezbollah’s festering threat or hope to deflect its attacks on to other countries. The longer the EU balks at effective action, the stronger the potential threat grows, funded by the free flow of donations, diverted charitable funds, and criminal booty out of the EU and the payments for drugs smuggled into the EU. As Winston Churchill observed: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” The Hezbollah crocodile has eaten half of Lebanon and has laid dangerous eggs around the world. The EU must take proactive action, not wait for these eggs to hatch.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Tom Lantos, Chairman
2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-5021

Subcommittee on Europe Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman You are respectfully requested to attend the following OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building . Date: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 Time: 1:00 PM Subject: Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Witnesses:

***Mr. Michael Jacobson
Senior Fellow
Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence, and Policy
The Washington Institute

Mr. Alexander Ritzmann
Senior Fellow
European Foundation for Democracy

Mr. James Phillips
Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs
The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies
The Heritage Foundation

***NOTE: Please be advised that the witness list has changed.

Adding Hezbollah to the EU Terrorist List

Testimony of

Dr. Matthew Levitt

Director of the Stein Program on Terrorism, Intelligence and Policy

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

June 20, 2007

Hearing of the

Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe
United States House of Representatives

Introduction: Why Designate Hezbollah Now?

Pressing our European allies to add Hezbollah to the European Union (EU)’s terrorism list is more important today than ever before. Nearly a year after it dragged both Lebanon and Israel into a devastating war last July, Hezbollah has reportedly restocked its weapons caches and missile arsenals, rebuilt much of its destroyed infrastructure, and capitalized on its ability to hold the Israel Defense Forces at bay (and the political reckoning that followed in Israel) to position itself as an even more dominant player in domestic Lebanese politics as well as the face of “resistance” and pride in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hezbollah’s proactive support for radical Palestinian elements engaged in acts of terrorism and political violence is central to these groups’ success and continues unabated. Renewed rocket attacks into northern Israel this week and the recent Hamas coup in Gaza (which tactically replicated Hezbollah tactics in Southern Lebanon) are just the most recent disturbing signs of how successful this strategy has been. Hezbollah is Syria’s primary proxy in Lebanon seeing to Syrian interests in the wake of the withdrawal of Syrian troops in April 2005, playing a particularly disruptive role opposing the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate and try suspects tied to the Hariri and other bombings targeting political and intellectual leaders of the anti-Syrian coalition. Hezbollah operatives are further suspected of training Iraqi insurgents and of sending it own combatants to Iraq.[1]

Hezbollah is particularly active in Europe, primarily engaged in financial and logistical support operations as well as political activity to legitimize its activities in the eyes of the West. An EU designation would undercut these activities and provide member states’ intelligence and law enforcement agencies greater authority to investigate the activities of Hezbollah operatives and supporters active within their borders. To the surprise of some, Hezbollah leaders themselves have expressed concern that an EU designation would severely undermine the organization’s activities.

The United States and Israel have long pressed their European allies to take action against Hezbollah, but France in particular has refused to follow America, Israel, Canada and Australia in banning Hezbollah, ostensibly for fear of upsetting the domestic political balance in Lebanon where members of the group hold seats in Parliament. A designation of Hezbollah by regional bodies like the EU is particularly important in light of the fact that UNSCR 1267 designations only apply to al-Qaeda and the Taliban – Hezbollah cannot be designated at the United Nations. Now, the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as France’s new president may represent the best chance yet for Europe to reconsider its position.

Europe as a Launching Pad for Operations Abroad

While Hezbollah has not conducted terrorist attacks in Europe for many years, it is still active in the region, using Europe primarily as a fundraising and recruiting ground.

A recently released German intelligence assessment estimates that 900 Lebanese Hezbollah members (an increase of 100 from previous reports) live in that country alone. Hezbollah has also used Europe as a launching pad from which to infiltrate operatives into Israel to conduct surveillance and carry out attacks.[2]

On top of its efforts to cripple the peace process, Hezbollah warrants European attention for its operations there. In the 1980s Hezbollah operatives carried out bombings in France and assassinations in Germany, and killed French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. But the group continues to operate out of Europe today. Consider some of Hezbollah’s operations in Europe:

In 1989, Bassam Gharib Makki, a Hezbollah operative and student in Germany, collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets in Germany. In 1989 and 1990, authorities apprehended a Hezbollah cell operating in Valencia, Spain. The cell was caught smuggling weapons in a ship from Cyprus so that they could be pre-positioned and cached in Europe. After tracking that shipment, authorities found additional explosives that had already been stashed in Europe. It was determined that the cell had been targeting US and Israeli targets in Europe. In 1997, Hezbollah was found to be collecting intelligence on the US Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. During the same period, members of a Hezbollah cell in Charlotte, North Carolina, paid indigent Americans to travel to Cyprus at Hezbollah’s expense and engage in sham marriages so additional operatives could get visas to come to America.[3] Throughout the mid- to late-1990s, Hezbollah recruited Palestinian students studying in Russia, and collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets there.

Today, German intelligence estimates that 800 Lebanese Hezbollah members live in Germany. The organization publishes a weekly newsletter in Germany, al-Ahd, though it scaled back its overt presence there after September 11, fearing a clampdown. An investigation in the summer of 2002 led German authorities to monitor the activities of an organization in Berlin suspected of being tied to Hezbollah and of establishing a “training center.”[4]

Over the past few years, Hezbollah has used Europe as a launching pad from which to infiltrate operatives into Israel to conduct surveillance and carry out attacks. In 1996 Hussien Makdad left Lebanon for Europe where members of a Hezbollah logistical support network provided him with a stolen British passport which he used to enter Israel on a flight from Switzerland. A few days later Makdad was badly injured in an explosion in his East Jerusalem hotel room where he was assembling a bomb made of RDX explosives. In 1997, Hezbollah operative Stephan Smyrek, a German convert to Islam trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, left Lebanon for Europe and then flew from Amsterdam to Israel on his own German passport. He was tasked with photographing prospective targets for attacks but was arrested at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. In 2000, Hezbollah dispatched Fawzi Ayub, a Canadian of Lebanese decent, to infiltrate Israel from Europe. He traveled from Lebanon on his own Canadian passport, and then sailed to Israel on a forged American passport he received in Europe. Ayub is described as a hardened Hezbollah operative, and is believed to have been sent to conduct attacks in Israel. And in 2001 Hezbollah operative Gerard Shuman, a dual British-Lebanese citizen, flew from Lebanon to Britain on his Lebanese passport and then on to Israel on his British passport. Arrested in Israel, Shuman is believed to have been sent to conduct surveillance operations.

In some of these cases, the authorities have determined that the operatives entered Israel to conduct operations, while in other cases it remains unclear whether they entered Israel just to collect pre-operational surveillance, assist other operatives already there, or conduct attacks themselves. Significantly, each of these operatives relied on European logistical support networks to carry out their missions. Moreover, each is also believed to have been trained by elements tied directly to Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.

In at least one case, Hezbollah’s European operations and the group’s efforts to undermine the peace process intersect. In mid-2003, Israeli forces arrested Ghulam Mahmud Qawqa, a member of an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades cell tied to Hezbollah, for his role in several al-Aqsa bombings in Jerusalem. According to information discovered after his arrest, Qawqa was in the process of engineering attacks on Israeli interests in Europe and Asia on behalf of Hezbollah. In late 2002, Qawqa tasked a Lebanese woman he knew in Germany to photograph the Israeli embassy in Berlin from multiple angles for a possible attack.[5]

The above is just a sampling of Hezbollah activity in Europe. Intelligence experts maintain that Hezbollah operatives are located throughout the European continent, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Hezbollah Fundraising in Europe

A ban would significantly constrain Hezbollah’s European activities, especially its ability to raise funds there. EU member states would be required to freeze any Hezbollah-controlled assets within their jurisdiction once the group was designated. Any financial transactions related to Hezbollah would be prohibited as well.

Hezbollah uses charities and front organizations to conceal their fundraising activities. Take, for example, Hezbollah’s Martyr’s Foundation. The “Martyr’s Organization” (Martyr Foundation, Bonyad-e Shahid), headed by Mohammad Hasan Rahimiyan, admittedly supplies charitable funds for the family of suicide bombers. In 2001, Paraguayan police searched the home of Hezbollah operative Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad in Ciudad Del Este, a town along the Tri-Border area where the borders of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet. Searching Fayad’s home, police found receipts from the Martyr’s Organization for donations Fayad sent totaling more than $3.5 million dollars.[6] Authories believe Fayad sent over $50 million to Hezbollah since 1995. According to press reports, Iran has traditionally funded Palestinian dissident groups in the Lebanese refugee camps, including al Maqdah, through the Institute of the Palestinian Martyrs.[7] According to German intelligence officials the Martyr Foundation actively raises funds for Hezbollah there.[8]

Another example is the Al-Mabarrat Charity Association headed by Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. Formerly the spiritual leader for Hezbollah, Fadlallah maintains intimate ties with the organization and remains on the U.S. Treasury’s list of Specially Designated Terrorists. In 2003, Lebanese Finance Minister Fuad Siniora was barred from entering the United States because of a donation he made to the Al-Mabarrat Charity Association in 2000.

In some cases, the foreign remittances discussed above are funneled to Hezbollah though the group’s charities. Members of the Hezbollah cell in Charlotte, North Carolina, received receipts from Hezbollah for their donations, including receipts from the office of then-Hezbollah spiritual leader Sheikh Mohammad Fadlallah.[9] One receipt, signed by Ali Abu Al Shaer, the financial manager of “the office of his Excellency Ayat Allah Mr. Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah,” thanked “brother Mohammed Hammoud,” the subsequently convicted leader of the Charlotte cell, for a $1,300 donation.[10]

According to a declassified research report based on Israeli intelligence Hezbollah also receives funds from charities that are not directly tied to Hezbollah but are radical Islamist organizations and donate to Hezbollah out of ideological affinity. “Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called ‘charity funds.’ Some of these are extremist Islamic institutions that, while not directly connected to Hezbollah, support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.”[11] The report cites many such charities worldwide, including four in the Detroit area alone: The Islamic Resistance Support Association, the al-Shaid Fund, the Educational Development Association (EDA) and the Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO). Also cited are the the al-Shahid Organization in Canada, the Karballah Foundation for Liberation in South Africa, the Lebanese Islamic Association and al-Shahid Social Relief Institution in Germany, and the Lebanese Welfare Committee, The Help Foundation and The Jam’iyat al-Abrar (Association of the Righteous) in Britain.

A particularly glaring example of a Hezbollah charity is the Islamic Resistance Support Organization (IRSO), designated a terrorist entity by the Treasury Department in August 2006. According to Treasury, IRSO solicited donations through Hezbollah’s al-Manar satellite television, which used to be broadcast in Europe and the United States. In its press release, Treasury noted that “Solicitation materials distributed by IRSO inform prospective donors that funds will be used to purchase sophisticated weapons and conduct operations. Indeed, donors can choose from a series of projects to contribute to, including, supporting and equipping fighters and purchasing rockets and ammunition.”[12]

While some of these funds undoubtedly paid for Hezbollah’s military and terrorist operations, other funds enable the group to provide its members with day jobs, to drape itself in a veil of legitimacy, and to build grassroots support among not only Shia but Sunni and Christian Lebanese as well. For example, Hezbollah runs the al-Janoub hospital in the southern Lebanese city of Nabatiyah – one out of a network of some fifty hospitals the group runs throughout the country. The hospital receives $100,000 a month from Hezbollah and is run by Ahmad Saad, the hospital director who is also a member of Hezbollah’s “national health committee.”[13]

Investigating Hezbollah Criminal Activity

An EU designation of Hezbollah would also facilitate European law enforcement and judicial cooperation against the group’s criminal activities in Europe. The EU instructs its member states to “fully exploit the powers conferred on them by acts of the European Union” when they are investigating or prosecuting entities on their terrorist list.[14] Interestingly, while engaging in criminal activity often increases terrorist groups’ vulnerability by exposing them to the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities, Hezbollah’s reliance on fellow sympathizers and members of local expatriate communities minimizes that potential exposure. In Germany, for example, investigations have revealed that Lebanese expatriates supportive of Hezbollah are often employed in the used-car business.[15] Still, as the case of Hezbollah criminal activity in the triborder region of South America makes clear, the group does engage in criminal activities that gave rise to the unwanted attention of local and international authorities, including mafia-style shakedowns of local store-owners, illegal pirating of multimedia, and the international drug trade. By enabling European law enforcement to “fully exploit” their investigative powers an EU ban of Hezbollah would be particularly effective.

Examples of Hezbollah’s worldwide criminal activity are indicative of the types of activity European law enforcement would be likely to uncover. Indeed, Hezbollah depends on a wide variety of criminal enterprises in regions across the world to support its activities.

In the United States, law enforcement officials are investigating a variety of criminal enterprises suspected of funding Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including the stealing and reselling of baby formula, food stamp fraud, and scams involving grocery coupons, welfare claims, credit cards, and even unlicensed t-shirts sales. U.S. officials believe “a substantial portion” of the estimated millions of dollars raised by Middle Eastern terrorist groups comes from the $20 million to $30 million annually brought in by the illicit scam industry in America.[16]

The most outstanding case in North America is the Charlotte North Carolina cell run by two brothers, Mohammed and Chawki Hamoud. In June 2002, the Hamoud brothers were convicted of a variety of charges including funding the activities of Hezbollah from the proceeds of an interstate cigarette smuggling ring. Seven other defendants pled guilty to a variety of charges stemming from this case, including conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, cigarette smuggling, money laundering and immigration violations.[17]

Mohammed Hassan Dbouk and his brother-in-law, Ali Adham Amhaz, ran the Canadian portion of this network under the command of Haj Hasan Hilu Laqis (Hezbollah’s chief military procurement officer). Their activities were funded in part with money that Laqis sent from Lebanon, in addition to their own criminal activities in Canada (eg, credit card and banking scams).[18]

Among the items that they purchased in Canada and the US and smuggled into Lebanon were night-vision goggles, global positioning systems, stun guns, naval equipment, nitrogen cutters and laser range finders. The Canadian Hezbollah network also sought to take out life insurance policies for Hezbollah operatives committing acts of terrorism in the Middle East.[19] According to a wiretapped conversation with another member of his cell that was summarized by Canadian intelligence, “Dbouk referred to a person down there [in Southern Lebanon] … who might in a short period of time go for a ‘walk’ … and never come back, and wondering if Said [the other cell member] could fix some papers and details … for him (person) and put himself (Said) as the reference.”[20]

Members of the Charlotte cell entered the U.S. from South America using false documents, entered into sham marriages in Cyprus, and conducted their activities under multiple identities. Cell members paid indigent Americans to travel to Cyprus at Hezbollah’s expense and engage in sham marriages so additional operatives could get visas to come to America.[21]

In South America, Hezbollah operatives engage in a wide range of criminal enterprises to raise, transfer, and launder funds in support of their terrorist activities. These enterprises include, among others, mafia-style shakedowns of local Arab communities, sophisticated import-export scams involving traders from India and Hong Kong, and small-scale businesses that engage in a few thousand dollars worth of business but transfer tens of thousands of dollars around the globe.[22] In one case, Paraguayan officials arrested Ali Khalil Mehri for selling millions of dollars in pirated software and funding Hezbollah with some of the profits.[23] The triborder area is especially important to Hezbollah, where the group raises close to $10,000,000 a year, according to a study produced by the U.S. Naval War College.[24]

According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Assad Barakat, “threatened TBA [triborder area] shopkeepers who are sympathetic to Hezbollah’s cause with having family members in Lebanon placed on a ‘Hezbollah blacklist’ if the shopkeepers did not pay their quota to Hezbollah via Barakat.”[25] The Treasury Department noted that Barakat is reported to be “the deputy to a Hezbollah financial director, Ali Kazan, and the primary liaison in the TBA for Hezbollah’s Spiritual Leader Hussein Fadlallah.”[26] Barakat not only served as a treasurer for Hezbollah, he was also “involved in a counterfeiting ring that distributes fake U.S. dollars and generates cash to fund Hezbollah operations” and personally couriered contributions to Lebanon for Hezbollah.[27] Barakat’s personal secretary, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, served as Hezbollah’s military leader in the triborder region. Fayad was arrested at least three times since 1999, including once for surveilling the U.S. embassy in Asuncion.[28]

Hezbollah activities in Latin America, however, are by no means limited to the triborder area. Chilean officials have identified several import-export companies, primarily located in free trade zones such as the Iquique Free Trade Zone (ZOFRI) in northern Chile, that are suspected as serving as either front organizations or shell companies for Hezbollah. These include Kalmiar Ltd, Bahamas Ltd., Las Vegas Nevada Ltd., San Francisco Ltd., Saleh Trading Ltd., Frankfourt Ltd., Guarany Ltd., Teen Chile Ltd., and Lucky Crown Ltd.[29]

According to Chilean law enforcement officials, “starting in 1980 Lebanese members of Hezbollah have been expanding its presence in South America and continue developing its network of contacts in the Triple Border area.”[30] In 1994 and 1995, these officials note, Hezbollah operatives began visiting Chile “to establish a new operational center for the development of their activities since the authorities of the Triple Border countries initiated greater and more rigorous control with respect to the activities of these foreigners, especially the Lebanese, who according to information provided by international security services are associated with terrorist members of Hezbollah.”[31]

Hezbollah operatives also run otherwise legitimate business enterprises that function as shell companies or fronts for raising, laundering and transferring large sums of money. The most egregious example appears to be the use of Western Union offices by local Hezbollah operatives. Though Western Union officials were not complicit in this activity, the company failed to make any real efforts to vet local operators even as their international operations grew exponentially over a few short years, especially in areas of conflict.[32] According to Israeli officials, Hezbollah operatives run several Western Union offices in Lebanon and use the coopted services of others worldwide, especially in Southest Asia. In some cases, where the local Western Union agent is a Hezbollah member or supporter, experts believe Hezbollah gets a cut of the 7% service fee charge split between Western Union and the local agent. In other cases, Hezbollah simply uses the money wiring company to launder and transfer funds. For example, Hezbollah funding to Palestinian terrorist groups in the West Bank is almost entirely transferred via Western Union – including some $3 million over a one year period in 2003-2004 alone.[33]

Targeting Hezbollah as Part of the Effort to Curb Iran

Moreover, targeting Hezbollah could help further international efforts against Iran. The Director of National Intelligence recently testified before Congress that Iran regards its ability to carry out terrorist attacks as a “key element of its national strategy.” Hezbollah receives funding, equipment and training from Iran and is “at the center” of this strategy. Some of this funding has been transferred through Europe. For example, Iran’s Bank Saderat, transferred Iranian Government funds to a Hizbollah-controlled entity via the bank’s London branch. In its press release, Treasury noted that Saderat “is used by the Government of Iran to transfer money to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. A notable example of this is a Hizballah-controlled organization that has received $50 million directly from Iran through Bank Saderat since 2001.”[34] In a speech before The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Kimmitt specifically tied Iran’s use of Bank Saderat to finance Hezbollah and other terrorist groups to Europe: “We took against Bank Saderat precisely because of its financial support of Hizballah and Hamas, including through Saderat branches in Europe. It was so very clear that Saderat was acting as the principal financing node for terrorist support and financial support of Hamas and Hizballah. Our efforts in this regard will have much more affect if European and other countries join us in putting pressure on Saderat.”[35]

Undermining Political Support for Hezbollah

Perhaps most telling, however, Hezbollah itself fears a European designation. According to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, this action would “destroy” the organization as “[t]he sources of our funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material support will be destroyed.” Hezbollah is eager to be seen as a legitimate political party. It seeks international recognition, and fears international political isolation and designation as an illicit actor. Along these lines, news that France has invited Hezbollah to Paris to participate in a political dialogue with other Lebanese parties is extremely disconcerting.[36]

Conclusion

Hezbollah remains markedly absent from the European Union’s list of banned terrorist organizations. On May 3, 2002, the EU added eleven organizations and seven individuals to its financial-blocking list of “persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist acts.” The action was significant because it marked the first time that the EU froze the assets of non-European terrorist groups. But in an effort to maintain a distinction between terrorist groups’ political and charitable activities on the one hand, and their direct terror wings on the other, the EU placed several individual Hezbollah terrorists on its list, but not the organization itself. The decision implied Hezbollah operatives are somehow independent of the group that recruits, trains, and funds them.

But both France and Germany have taken action against Hezbollah in the last few years, suggesting the possibility that European officials may in fact see Hezbollah for the threat it is. In December 13, 2004, after a year-long debate, France’s highest administrative court ordered France-based satellite provider Eutelsat to discontinue all broadcasts of the Hezbollah’s satellite channel, Al-Manar.[37] The ban was finally instituted after a guest asserted there were Zionist attempts to spread AIDS among Arabs. [38] And in January 2005, a German court upheld a lower court’s deportation order against a Hezbollah representative who had lived in Germany for some 20 years. The Dusseldorf court denied the Hezbollah member a visa saying he “is a member of an organization that supports international terrorism.” In a statement, the court said that “Hezbollah is waging a war with bomb attacks against Israel with ‘inhumane brutality’ against civilians.” The court also ruled that Germany should not be bound by the absence of Hezbollah from the EU terrorism list.[39]

Even with French support, which is not a certainty, a European designation of Hezbollah is by no means guaranteed. The other EU member states opposed to this action have been largely content to let France serve as the public face on this issue, and it is difficult to gauge how they would react. However, given the stakes and the potential opportunity, the US should press its European allies to designate Hezbollah, and soon.

——————————————————————————–

[1] Michael R. Gordon and Dexter Filkins, “Hezbollah helps Iraqi Shiite Army, U.S. official says,” New York Times, November 28, 2006; Nathan Gutman, “U.S. Sources Claim Hezbollah Sending Combatants to Iraq,” Haaretz, June 20, 2004

[2] Bundesministerium des Innern, “Verfassungsschutz - bericht 2006″

(Federal Ministry of the Interior - Protection of the Constitution - report 2006),

http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2007/Verfassungsschutzbericht__2006__de,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Verfassungsschutzbericht_2006_de.pdf

[3] United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District.

[4] “Germany Bans A Charity Organization Close to Hamas and Will Possibly Ban another Close to Hezbollah,” Asharq al Awsat, August 6, 2002

[5] “Germany Surprised to Learn From Press of Plan to Kill Israeli Envoy,” Spiegel Online (Hamburg), 3 January 2003, translated by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 January 2003; “Hezbollah (part 1): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel, June 2003; and author interview with intelligence sources, July 2003

[6] Mark S. Steinitz, “Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America,” Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol. XIV, Study 7, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2003

[7] “PLO Bids to Win Back Refugee Support,” Agence France-Presse, July 5, 1994; Muntasser Abdallah, “Iran Pours Thousands of Dollars in Lebanon’s Palestinian Camps,” Agence France-Presse, June 21, 2002

[8] Author interview with German officials, Berlin, Germany, June 2007

[9] Hezbollah: A Case Study of Global Reach.

[10] Copy of receipt, presented as evidence in US v. Mohammed Hammoud, in author’s personal files.

[11] Hizbullah (Part I): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,” Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, (CSS), Israel, June 2003, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/hizbullah/hezbollah.htm.

[12] Treasury Designates Key Hizballah Fundraising Organization, August 29, 2006, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp73.htm

[13] Scott Wilson, “Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,” The Washington Post, December 20, 2004, A17

[14] “SCADPlus: Freezing funds: list of terrorists and terrorist groups.” Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33208.htm

[15] Author interview with German officials, Berlin, Germany, June 2007

[16] John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “Small Scams Probed for Terror Ties: Muslim-Arab Stores Monitored as Part of post-Sept. 11 Inquiry. The Washington Post, August 12, 2002.

[17] United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District.

[18] United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District; .Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘In the Party of God, Hizbullah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States’, The New Yorker 28 October 2002.

[19] United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District.

[20] Transcript of Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) transcript for Wednesday, May 26, 1999, author’s personal files.

[21] United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District.

[22] Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Party of God: Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States,” The New Yorker Magazine, October 28, 2002.

[23] Mark S. Steinitz, “Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America,” Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol. XIV, Study 7, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2003

[24] Paul D. Taylor, Editor, “Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South,” Newport Paper No. 21, Newport Papers, Naval War College, 2004

[25] “Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hezbollah in Tri-border Area,” Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 10, 2004, available online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1720.htm

[26] “Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hezbollah in Tri-border Area,” Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 10, 2004, available online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1720.htm

[27] “Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hezbollah in Tri-border Area,” Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 10, 2004, available online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1720.htm

[28] “Treasury Designates Islamic Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hezbollah in Tri-border Area,” Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury, June 10, 2004, available online at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1720.htm

[29] Text of presentation by Chilean Police Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, at a law enforcement conference in Santiago, Chile, March 2002, author’s personal files.

[30] Text of presentation by Chilean Police Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, at a law enforcement conference in Santiago, Chile, March 2002, author’s personal files.

[31] Text of presentation by Chilean Police Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, at a law enforcement conference in Santiago, Chile, March 2002, author’s personal files.

[32] Glenn R. Simpson, “Expanding in an Age of Terror, Western Union Faces Scrutiny as Fund-Transfer System Grows In Risky Parts of the World,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2004

[33] Author interview with Israeli officials, Tel Aviv, May 2004

[34] Treasury Cuts Iran’s Bank Saderat Off From U.S. Financial System, September 8, 2006, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp87.htm

[35] Ambassador Robert Kimmitt, “The Role of Finance in Combating National Security Threats,” Q &A summary, Remarks before The Washington Institute’s nineteenth annual Soref Symposium. May 17, 2007, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2605

[36] Yaniv Salama-Scheer and Herb Keinon, “Sarkozy Invites Hizbullah to France, The Jerusalem Post, June 12, 2007

[37] “France seeks EU debate after banning Hezbollah-linked TV channel,” Agence France Presse, 15 December 2004

[38] Roula Khalaf, “French court blocks way for Hizbollah TV: Jewish groups are outraged at ‘anti-Semitism’ but al-Manar claims freedom of speech,” Financial Times, 15 December 2004

[39] “Lebanese Hezbollah official forced to leave Germany,” Agence France Presse, 5 January 2005.

“Al Anbaa called him 15 mins prior to his martyrdom, Edio: the court…”

On June 14, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Anbaa carried an interview with slain Deputy Walid Eido, by Ittihad Darwish who conducted the interview the same day on which Eido was assassinated: “When I called Deputy Walid Eido on 5:15 PM to complete some points of the interview which Al Anbaa conducted in the morning, he was preparing himself for martyrdom. He told me: “Ittihad, I will be available starting at 7:30 PM…” I didn’t know where he was or what his destiny could be. He confirmed that he would be at 7:30 [PM] on the phone number “that you have”. He was aware not to mention the number [landline] while we were talking on the cell phone… With a bit of caution, he tried to convince me to meet tomorrow in the Parliament, but after I insisted, he agreed to conduct a phone meeting”… The following is the transcript of the interview:

“Q: “Now that the international tribunal was ratified in the Security Council, is it still called a tribunal with an international character or only an international tribunal?

“A: “The opinions differ regarding the name of the tribunal after it was ratified in the Security Council without passing though the Lebanese constitutional institutions. Apparently, we can call it an international court because it is produced by the Security Council without any agreement between the latter and the Lebanese government… As for the content, the basis agreed upon between the United Nations and the Lebanese governments is still available regarding the appointment of Lebanese magistrates and the necessity to refer to Lebanese laws upon the implementation process, in addition to the agreement that must be held between the United Nations and Lebanon on the location and funding… Hence, at the level of the structure, the court is an international tribunal, while on the level of the content; it is a tribunal with an international character.

“Q: “Do you think that ratifying the tribunal without an internal consensus succeeded in ending a harsh period of internal disagreements over the court?

“A: “Undoubtedly, the ratification of the international tribunal in the Security Council means that the stage of the struggle over the truth and justice in Lebanon has ended in the interest of justice and the Lebanese people. We hope [the court] succeeded in putting an end to a big disagreement. In fact, the court headed the agenda of national dialogue, and all the Lebanese rival leaders affirmed that the international court is a consensual issue… But in fact, we witnessed many obstacles which I believe were not only [seen in] the retreat from supporting the court, but also in the efforts made to hinder the agreement signed between the Unite Nations and the Lebanese government in this regard.

“It is necessary to say that the court is not a means for revenge because no one could restore the Martyr Rafik Hariri or the other martyrs, but we can say it is a gate to put an end, not to terrorism which will presumably continue just as the sedition and destabilization attempts will remain ongoing, but indeed, the perpetrator of the crimes will bear in mind that he will be prosecuted or revealed…

“Q: “How do you read the voices that cautioned against ratifying the international tribunal with its adopted formula [under Chapter 7], as many domestic and regional and international sides announced, and the thing that was clearly revealed among the members of the Security Council?

“A: “We have heard an echo for statements made by Syria and some of the Lebanese. Many sides warned that ratifying the court will constitute a prelude for chaos, instability, and internal struggles. But in fact, the result should be contrary to what had been said… As we said before, certain Lebanese sides are embarrassed by the issue of the court and its ratification inside the Lebanese institutions… Now that the court has become a true reality, the Lebanese should act upon the fact that the court, on which they were unanimous, has become a reality and that no one is capable of hindering it…

“Q: “There are some sides saying that the ratification of the international court under Chapter 7 [of the UN Charter] according to UNSCR 1757, placed the Lebanese State under an international tutelage?

“A: “The Security Council is eligible to take adequate measures when world peace in any region is threatened or when there are terrorist activities which lead to the destabilization of world peace. Accordingly, this doesn’t undermine sovereignty, it is a translation for a legal article in the UN Charter, which we have agreed on and we consider ourselves as one of the countries that participated in drafting this Charter… There is a Lebanese majority and there is a Lebanese consensus on the court, and thus, the Security Council did not replace us, but the constitutional institutions were hindered. Hence, we signed a petition in which we told the parliamentary speaker that we want to convene a parliamentary session in order to vote on the tribunal…

“Q: “Does the UNSCR 1757 poses any threats? And what are its consequences? Or is such talk launched by those who reject the court?

“A: “Let me tell you this, what happened after ratifying the international investigative committee under Chapter 7? Wars didn’t break out in Lebanon, and ships didn’t arrive to implement this court. And what does it mean if the court is created under Chapter 6 which is not obligatory and accordingly, no one will respond to this court or abide by its requests… Hence, such a court will not be effective enough. The compulsory characteristic of the court is only ensured through Chapter 7, but without resorting to power since there are many steps to be taken before employing power, which itself necessitates a new resolution by the Security Council…

“Q: “Does the court topple all the privileges and immunities and is it capable of arraigning whoever it requests? And what if some persons refuse to respond?

“A: “This is a very important legal point. First, the court is compulsory and thus, each person whom the court prosecutes is obliged to show up… According to Lebanese and international law and based on the court’s regulations, the court is authorized to arraign anyone who is affiliated with the crime regardless of his status. Undeniably, it is a terrorist crime and the perpetrator – even if he enjoys a privilege or immunity - should yield to this court and deliver his statements. The text [of the court] stipulates that the court has the right to bring in any person whose statements might be in the interest of the investigation.

“As for the superior-subordinate relation, this issue is related to Lebanese law which stipulates that the acts committed by a subordinate do not relive his or her superior of criminal responsibility, according to certain cases and not absolutely. Not every superior is responsible unless he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such a crime and the superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. This is determined by the court’s estimations and the judicial work.

“Q: “There are some [sides] saying that Lebanon has become a prey for internationalization and that security has been internationalized through the international forces [UNIFIL] in the south. They also claim that the economy and judiciary are also internationalized, how do you respond to this?

“A: “Those who fear the court are issuing such statements. Can you please show me how the judiciary is internationalized? If this is true, who made us reach [this point]? Wouldn’t it have been better for those who are launching such allegations to discuss all of these issues in the parliamentary and governmental institutions? Thus, they would have been able to ratify the court under Chapter 6? They made us reach here, and let them shoulder their responsibilities. I want to reassure them that we are not puppets for the US or any other side.

“We are just seeking for the truth and justice… I want to say on behalf of the Future parliamentary bloc that we will not stand against Syria in terms of the state and the people; we will only stand against anyone whom the court condemns and holds him responsible of assassinating slain PM Rafiq Hariri. We only want the truth and if Syria is not the perpetrator, then we will stand by Syria during the trial in order to prevent condemning it.”